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Delaware Serves Shareholders the "Poison Pill": Moran v. Household International,
Inc.' — In recent years, hostile acquisitions of publicly traded private corporations have
posed a perpetual threat to the positions of board members and senior management of
potential target companies. As the market has demonstrated, almost any public corpo-
ration can become a takeover target. 2 Commentators have debated heatedly over the
effects of takeover battles on the economy and the propriety of state imposed regulation. 5
Courts manifest the legal perspective of these battles by their scrutiny of the actions of
the parties involved.
The level of judicial review in the corporate takeover context often reflects the
court's interpretation of the appropriate role of corporate directors. On the one hand,
if directors' sole responsibility, as overseers of the corporation and agents of the share-
holders, is to maximize the short-term value of the corporation, then courts should not
permit directors to interfere with tender offers.' The shareholders themselves should
decide at what price they are willing to sell their investments. On the other hand, if
directors' responsibilities span a broader context of economic development, then courts
should defer to directors' judgments regarding the impact of a takeover on long-term
corporate planning and policies for growth and developments When a board of directors
makes a good faith determination that a takeover is not in the best long-term interests
of the corporation, courts should recognize the board's duty to oppose it.6
Directors have responded to takeover attempts with a variety of strategies. Some of
these strategies, commonly known as "scorched earth" tactics, redeploy sought-after
corporate assets, making the target less attractive.' Other measures, such as "lock-up"
1 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
2 See, e.g., Some Strategies to Avoid Unfriendly Acquisitions, N.Y.L.J., May 28, 1985, at 25, col. 2
("Given the availability of funds for purposes of hostile acquisitions — financing of ventures up to
several billion dollars — even size does not guarantee security. Companies as large as Gulf Oil,
Phillips Petroleum and Continental Group have found themselves in play, threatened by unsolicited,
yet credible, takeover bids.").
• Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV, 1161 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role]
(arguing that tender offers are a check on management's efficiency and tendency to "shirk" the
corporation's interests) with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Lipton] (condemning takeovers as disruptive of long-term planning and de-
velopment of modern corporations).
See Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 3, at 1164. (Tender offers are public
offerings to buy stock directed at current shareholders to sell their shares to the bidder at the price
offered.) But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos. 353, 354, slip op. at 7
(Del. Mar. 13, 1986), where the court noted its approval of a board's adoption of a defensive poison
pill notes purchase rights plan which ultimately helped to increase the return to shareholders by
forcing the bidder to increase his bid price. The court's approval came, however, only after the
plan had been revoked. Id.
See Lipton, supra note 3, at 103-04.
6 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1195 (N.D. III. 1980) affil, 646 F.2d
271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) ("Having so decided in good faith, with
rational business purposes attributable to their decision, directors have not only the right, but the
duty to resist by all lawful means persons whose attempts to win control of the corporation, if
successful, would harm the corporate enterprise.") (quoting Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st
Cir. 1977)).
One form of defensive asset redeployment is a board's sale of its ''crown jewel," its most
attractive asset or subsidiary which has caused the corporation to be the focus of a takeover attempt.
See, e.g•, Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Brunswick Corporation, in
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options, achieve the same result by tying up assets via agreements with "white knights"
— friendly acquirers with whom directors negotiate terms to preclude a hostile acquirer
from obtaining rights in the asset.' Directors also have negotiated to redistribute common
stock voting power into friendly hands, thereby preventing a hostile buyer from acquiring
vodng control of the corporation."
By preventing hostile takeovers, directors deny shareholders takeover premiums
which would have been available but for the board's actions. Disgruntled shareholders
may resort to the courts to determine whether they may recover for the premiums
denied by proving the directors acted improperly. Where directors have adopted any of
the various antitakeover strategies, a danger exists that the directors may he acting for
personal interests, such as to entrench themselves in their positions of control of the
corporation. Therefore, courts have scrutinized the directors' antitakeover actions to
determine whether the directors have acted in bad faith — for personal interests rather
than in the corporation's best interests.'"
Courts disagree on whether directors who will lose their positions in a hostile
takeover necessarily present a sufficient conflict of personal and corporate interests to
require close scrutiny of their actions," When directors adopt a reasonable defense
the face of a takeover threat, sold its highly successful Sherwood Medical Division, a wholly owned
subsidiary, and thereby dissolved the threat).
" In a "lock - up arrangement," a target corporation grants a "white knight," a third party with
whom management has negotiated favorable terms, an option to purchase a "crown jewel" in the
event of an outsider's hostile acquisition of the target corporation. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. Mac-
Andrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos. 353, 354, slip op. (Del. Mar. 13, 1986), In an attempt to
thwart the efforts of Pantry Pride, Inc. to buy out Revlon, Inc., the Revlon board granted a third
party, Forstmann little & Co., a lock-up option to purchase a Revlon subsidiary at a price signifi-
cantly below market value. This option would become exercisable, however, only if another acquirer
obtained 40% of Revlon's outstanding shares of common stock. The Revlon board also adopted
other defensive measures. including a "no-shop provision" — a promise to deal exclusively with the
chosen white knight — and a note pus -chase rights plan. Id. at 5. See also Mobil Oil Co, v. Marathon
Oil Co., 669 F,2(1 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (Marathon, fighting off an unfriendly takeover attempt by
Mobil, granted United States Steel an option to purchase its "crown jewel" — a valuable oil field).
The issuance of stock to "friendly hands" to redistribute or retain a voting majority, as in
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 999 (1981), or the
reacquisition of shares by a target company at an inflated price, may hinder an insurgent's ability
to acquire a majorit y position in the company stock. See, e.g., Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,
43 Del. Clt, 353, 362. 230 A.2d 769, 773 (1967). A board may choose to reacquire shares held by
a hostile parry, generally being forced to pay an exaggerated premium, to relieve the corporation
of the threat the hostile party represented. Some investors acquire large blocks of a company in
hopes of obtaining this "greenmail" premium. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 956 (Del 1985) (noting that Boone Pickens has a national reputation as a "greenmailer").
Other strategic defenses employed have involved corporate acquisitions of assets or subsidiaries
to create antitrust and other regulatory problems for a seeking acquirer. In Panics. , for example,
the target company negotiated agreements for store locations in malls where the acquirer was
already present. 646 F.2c1 at 278. As a result, a successful takeover would have had monopolistic
implications and legal consequences. Id.
'u See, e.g., Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH ) II 95,863, at 91,136 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (finding target board's "sole, primary, com-
pelling and controlling purpose ... to thwart the ... tender offer"); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer
Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 362, 230 A.2d 769, 773 (1967) (finding primary purpose of stock issuance to
prevent takeover).
" Compare Farmer. 646 F.2d at 295 (refusing to shift burden to directors where transaction
would have the effect of their retaining control) with Chen' v. Mathes, 41 Del, Ch. 494, 504, 199
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measure to protect their corporation from what they believe to be a threat to corporate
policy or effectiveness, most courts will presume the decision was made in good faith
after reasonable investigation and in the best interests of the corporation.' 2 These pre-
sumptions constitute the business judgment rule, which courts invoke in deferring to
the business judgment of a corporation's directors. When a board of directors, con-
fronted with an immediate hostile takeover attempt, that is, a tender offer of which the
board does not approve, takes some action to disenchant the would-be acquirer or to
divert voting control into friendly hands, the business judgment rule presumptions may
limit the scope of judicial review.
Traditionally, courts have been cautious in comparing their hindsight business judg-
ment with the board's on-the-spot expertise,'" but in recent years the Delaware courts
have intensified their scrutiny of directorial actions." In Unocal Corp, v. Mesa Petroleum
Co.,'' for example, the Delaware Supreme Court established a two-part judicial inquiry
first to determine whether the directors confronted with the hostile takeover attempt
had reasonable grounds for believing that corporate policy and effectiveness were threat-
ened, and second to determine if the directors' action was reasonable in relation to the
threat recognized.' 6 Only upon satisfying these inquiries, the Unocal court held, would
the business judgment rule assumptions of propriety be afforded the directors' actions. 17
The Delaware Supreme Court designed this threshold test to ensure that the directors
had satisfied the prerequisites for the business judgment rule — due care, loyalty to the
corporation, and independence front the transaction.'$
When a board adopts a defensive measure prospectively, as a general defense against
the possibility of future takeover attempts, and that measure forces acquirers to negotiate
with the board prior to extending a tender offer to shareholders, it becomes especially
difficult for a court to determine whether the board has acted in the best interests of
the corporation. If. there is no immediate hostile offer, there is no threat for courts to
evaluate and the basis for the directors' action is unclear. It is crucial, therefore, that
courts carefully scrutinize the purpose and effect of the adoption of a prospective
defensive measure in order to ensure that the directors are not acting for personal
interests, such as entrenchment in their positions of control over the corporation.
When a board of directors adopts a poison pill rights plan as a prospective defensive
measure deterring hostile takeover attempts, as did the board of Household in Moran v.
Household International, Inc. ,I 9 the issues of whether the board acted within its scope of
authority and whether it acted for a proper purpose become particularly critical. A rights
A.2d 546, 554 (Del. 1964) (shifting burden to directors to prove good faith in authorizing corpo-
ration's purchase of its own stock, to deter a takeover attempt).
12 See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966).
Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?,
37 Bus. LAW. 27, 31-32 (1981).
" See infra notes 151-74 and accompanying text, discussing three recent cases in which the
Delaware Supreme Court has conducted searching reviews of board actions.
15 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
• 16 Id. at 955.
' 7 Id. at 954.
' 8 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1985). See also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The Unocal
court found that "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred." Id.
' 8 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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plan is enacted by a board of directors creating and issuing stock rights for the purchase
of shares of a new class of preferred stock. The issuance of these rights does not require
shareholder approval .2° These rights are issued to stockholders as a dividend on common
stock. Besides the right to purchase preferred stock, the rights also have a "poison pill"
aspect designed to deter would-be acquirers. The deterrent may assume many forms,
but always the holder, upon the occurrence of a triggering event, becomes entitled to
some highly favorable exchange, the burden of which is borne by the hostile acquirer.
Triggering events are typically the announcement of a tender offer for a controlling
share of the outstanding common voting stock or the accumulation of a controlling share
of common stock for the commencement of a proxy contest."
The deterrent provision of a rights plan may be tailored to ensure that all share-
holders will be treated fairly in the event of a hostile acquisition. This objective may be
achieved by a redemption clause, which permits shareholders to redeem their shares for
some predetermined fair price, or a conversion clause, which permits shareholders to
exchange their stock in an acquired corporation for an equal value of the acquirer's
stock. 22 Flip-over provisions may also protect shareholders by taking a stock right which
previously entitled holders to purchase shares of the corporation owned, and flipping it
over, upon acquisition of the corporation by a hostile acquirer, to entitle the holders to
buy shares of the acquirer. Any of these means can ensure that stockholders are treated
fairly by guaranteeing a fair exchange for their investments.
These rights plan deterrent devices can also be abused. Boards of directors, for
example, can prevent hostile acquisitions by artificially inflating the return guaranteed
to the stockholders. Where, instead of a fair price, the right entitles the holder to receive
from an acquirer some multiple of the value of the holder's investment, the issue of
abuse arises. In these situations, the penalty imposed on an acquirer is evidence that
directors are seeking some objective other than merely protecting shareholders.
Present controversy over rights plans focuses on the directors' reserved right to
redeem the rights at a nominal price if the directors approve of a tender offer. As a
result of this power to redeem, offerors must negotiate with the board and obtain their
approval of any offer the bidder seeks to extend to the shareholders. 23 Where the
directors deny approval, the offeror is subjected to the "poison" of the rights plan and
acquisition becomes infeasible." Thus, the employment of a rights plan may preclude
211 The board's authority to create and issue stock rights plans is derived from DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 157 (1983) (authorizing a board to create, adopt, and issue new classes of securities by board
resolution).
21 A proxy contest is the solicitation of shareholder votes to challenge the incumbent board of
directors.
22 See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill"
Preferred, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1964-65 (1984).
73 Moran v. Household Ina 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), aff 'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
24 The Moran court found that there were "many methods around the Plan" adopted by the
Household board. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. The Securities and Exchange Commission (filing - a
brief amicus curiae for Moran) found that the Rights Plan deterred "virtually all hostile tender
offers." Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission (amicus curiae), at 12, Moran v. Household
Ina 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews Sc Forbes Holdings, Inc., Nos. 353, 354, slip op. (Del. Mar. 13, ,
1986), the Revlon Board adopted a poison pill plan, but also passed a resolution redeeming the
rights in connection with any cash proposal exceeding a stated minimum bid. Id. at 7. The offerer's
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potential acquirers from considering the corporation as a potential target because they
face the added risk of rejection of their offer by the board's ability to defeat their
purchase attempt. 25
Moran v. Household International, Inc. 26 is the first case in which the Delaware Supreme
Court ruled on the validity of a board's adoption of a "poison pill" rights plan as a
prospective defensive measure. Household International is a holding company consisting
of several independently operating subsidiaries engaged in diverse industries. 27 Early in
1984, the board of directors, concerned with Household's vulnerability to hostile take-
overs, 28 obtained the services of a proxy solicitation consultant to evaluate the prospect
of shareholder approval of a fair-price amendment to the corporation's charter. 29
 After
learning that the prospects were dim, Household's chairman sought legal and financial
advice to formulate an alternative defensive proposal. 9° Following written and oral
presentations and extended discussion, the Household board adopted a highly complex
preferred stock purchase rights plan (the Rights Plan) prepared for them by the law
firm of Wachtel', Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the originators of "poison pills."'
Under the Rights Plan, one right to purchase preferred stock would be issued as a
dividend to stockholders for each. share of common stock held. The rights could be
exercised only upon the occurrence of a triggering event — a person or group's acqui-
sition of 20% of Household's common stock, or the announcement of a tender offer for
30% of Household's stock." Once triggered, the rights would entitle the holder to
purchase shares of a newly issued preferred stock at a price which far exceeded their
market value. 23
 If the holder did not purchase the preferred stock, a flip-over provision
bid exceeded the minimum, thus gaining the implicit approval of the board for the purpose of
redeeming the rights. Id.
25 But see id. at 4. In Revlon, the acquirer, Pantry Pride, announced a tender offer conditioned
upon its receiving at least 90% of the outstanding common stock or otherwise conditioned on the
board's removal of the impending note rights. Id. The risk remains that the conditions will not be
met, but otherwise, such conditional offers may avoid the harm of poison pills.
26 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
27 Id at 1349.
"Moran v. Household int .], 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch.), aff 'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
The Household board's concern with coercive two-tier takeovers was founded on several factors.
First, as a diversified holding company, Household would be vulnerable to a "bust-up" takeover,
whereby highly leveraged acquirers could sell off pieces of the corporation to pay off their debt.
Id. at 1064. Second, recent market activity showed special interest in the financial services industry
(Household Finance Co. is one of Household's wholly owned subsidiaries). Third, the plaintiff,
John A. Moran, a board member, also declared the interest of his company, D-K-M, in buying out
Household. A study performed by D-K-M indicated that Household was undervalued in relation
to its break-up value. Id.
24 Id. As a charter amendment, the fair price provision may only be adopted by a shareholder
majority vote. 8 Dec. Cony ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). The provision considered by Household required
supermajority voting approval of acquisitions and mergers and set a minimum acceptable price.
Moran, 490 A.2d at 1064 n.l.
3° Moran, 490 A.2d at 1064. The consultant estimated the shareholder approval rate at 50.8%
to 58.3% Id.
3, Id. at 1067.
32 Id. at 1066.
" Id. Shareholders were unlikely to purchase the preferred stock due to the exercise price and
terms of the stock. A $100 exercise price entitles the holder to purchase 1/100 share of preferred
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provided that, in the event of a merger or consolidation, the holder could purchase
$200 worth of the acquirer's stock for $100 (the "two-for-one flip-over" provision). 34
The Household board could redeem the rights for $.50 per right at any time prior
to the 20% triggering event — the acquisition by a person or group of 20% of House-
hold's outstanding stock.33 Once the 20% trigger occurred, however, the rights became
a permanent part of Household's capital structure for their ten-year life. 36 If a tender
offer were made for 30% of Household's stock, the board would have to consider
redeeming the rights. The board viewed this right of redemption as a strong negotiating
device which they could employ to protect the interests of all constituencies of the
corporate family." All but two of Household's directors, a majority of which were
independent (not members of Household's management), approved the Rights Plan. 3°
Following the board's adoption of the Rights Plan, John A. Moran, a director of
Household, and his company, Dyson-Kisner-Moran Corporation (D-K-M) filed suit in
the Court of Chancery of Delaware against Household and thirteen of its directors who
voted to adopt the Rights Plan." Moran's action sought to invalidate Household's Rights
Plan on the grounds that it abridged fundamental rights of stock ownership by restricting
the alienability and marketability of Household shares, and it severely limited the ability
of shareholders to engage in proxy contests: 4° Household responded that the Rights
Plan was designed for the protection of both the shareholders and the corporation.'"






38 Id. at 1067. The Household Board consisted of sixteen directors: nine independent, one a
retired chief executive officer and chairman, and six members of senior management. Id. at 1064.
35 Id. at 1063. Suit was filed in Delaware because Household was incorporated in that state.
Gred Goiter, a shareholder, was permitted to intervene as an additional plaintiff. Id. Goiter reiterated
Moran's claims and challenged a board resolution amending Household's employee stock option
plan. Id. at 1081.
" Id. at 1064. Moran brought suit both individually, as a corporate director, to protect the
rights of the shareholders, and derivatively, as a shareholder. Id. at 1063. The court found that
Moran had no standing as a director, but rather that the claims were derivative in nature. Id. at
1071.
. 41 Id. at 1068. Household counterclaimed that Moran had violated his directorial fiduciary duty
by abusing his position to gain access to confidential information which he used for personal gain
at the expense of the shareholders. Id. at 1082. The court held for Moran on this counterclaim
because no evidence indicated that the information was confidential or that it was used against the
corporation. Id. The issue was not appealed.
Household moved to dismiss the claim on three grounds: failure to comply with procedural
requirements of a derivative suit, lack of ripeness, and failure to join necessary parties. Id. at 1069.
The court denied the motion for dismissal. Id. at 1074. The asserted procedural failure to make a
demand on the board to remedy the dispute prior to litigation, the court held, was excused for '
futility. Id. at 1071 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (excuse of demand where a
derivative plaintiff alleges facts creating a reasonable doubt that directors were disinterested and
independent and validly exercising their business judgment)). The court then held that Moran's
claim was ripe because Moran alleged that the Rights Plan deterred tender offers and, if this were
so, injury would result in the absence of specific tender offers. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1072. Finally,
the court found that other shareholders need not be joined because their interests were adequately
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Moran argued that the Household directors were not entitled to protection from
judicial scrutiny under the business judgment rule because their actions were beyond
their authority and were intended to accomplish the improper purpose of entrench-
ment.42 Even if the court were to apply the business judgment rule, Moran further
argued, the rule would require that the Household directors bear the burden of proving
that the Rights Plan was reasonable and fair to the shareholders.'s
Finding that the directors had not acted for an improper purpose, the trial court
deferred to the board's judgment by invoking the business judgment rule presumptions
of good faith, reasonable investigation, and acting in the corporation's best interests.'"
The court held that the burden of proving good faith did not shift to the board where
Moran had not shown that the directors acted for the sole or primary purpose of
entrenchment. 45 Evidence that entrenchment was only one of the board's motives, the
court stated, was insufficient to shift the burden.16
Having held the business judgment rule applicable to the Household board's adop-
tion of the Rights Plan, the trial court next found that Delaware General Corporation
Law authorized the Household board to adopt the Rights Plan. 47 The board derived this
authority, the court reasoned, from section 151 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law,'" which empowers the board to issue new classes of securities, and National Education
Corp. v. Bell & Howell, which interpreted section 151 to include securities issued for non-
financial purposes. 49 The Moran trial court found that the board's authority to adopt a
defensive measure derived from its responsibility to govern the corporation, and, there-
fore, that the board was entitled to formulate takeover policy." The adopted Rights Plan
was within the board's discretion, the court held, because it did not unduly restrict
alienation of the stock, 5 ' or subvert corporate democracy," and because entrenchment
was not the board's primary purpose for adopting the Rights Plan." The court deter-
mined that the infringements upon shareholders' rights were acceptable as incidental to
the board's valid exercise of its business judgment."
represented by the parties already involved in the litigation. Id. at 1074. Delaware Chancery Rule
19(a) mandates joinder of parties whose presence is required to afford complete justice to the
parties present and where the absent parties claim an interest in the subject matter of the litigation
and their absence would impair their ability to protect that interest. Id. at 1072-74.
42 Id. at 1075.
43 Id. at 1074-75.
44 Id. at 1076.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1076-77. The court found the Rights Plan authorized under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 157 (1983) (authorizing the issuance of stock rights) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1983)
(permitting the issuance of preferred shares with non-financially related terms). Id. The court found
that the Rights Plan did not violate DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (1983) (prohibiting restrictions
on the transferability of stock). Id. at 1079.
'a Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1974).
49 No. 7278, slip op. at 1, 10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983).
5° Moran, 490 A.2d at 1079.
5 ' Id.
52 Id. at 1080.
" Id. at 1082.
54 Id. at 1082-83. The court found that all aspects of plaintiff intervenor's claim merged with
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In affirming the trial court's decision," the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
business judgment rule was the appropriate standard for reviewing the board of direc-
tors' decision to adopt a poison pill rights plan." Recognizing the inherent conflict facing
directors confronting hostile takeover attempts, however, the Moran court followed
Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co." in conducting a threshold inquiry into the
appropriateness of the directors' action." Pursuant to Unocal, the court placed an initial
burden on the directors to come forward with evidence showing reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed ; and showing that
the rights plan was reasonable in relation to the demonstrated danger." A perceived
threat in the marketplace of coercive two-tier tender offers," the court held, was a
sufficient threat to justify the Household board's adoption of a poison pill rights plan
with a two-for-one flip-over entitling shareholders to purchase $200 worth of an acquir-
er's stock for $100. 6 ' Ruling that the Rights Plan was a reasonable measure adopted for
a valid purpose and was authorized under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the
court deferred to the board's decision by invoking the business judgment rule presump-
tions to protect the decision. 62
 Because Moran did not adequately rebut the presumptions
by proving the directors had acted in bad faith to retain their control, the court upheld
the Rights Plan without further scrutiny."
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Moran effectively permits a board of
directors to appoint itself negotiating agent for the shareholders. This •power exceeds
the directors' scope of authority and infringes on fundamental shareholder rights. In
Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court correctly extended the application of the Unocal
test• to prospective defensive measures, that is, defense mechanisms adopted in antici-
pation of hostile takeovers where no specific threat of takeover exists. 64 The Moran court,
however, applied the Unocal threshold burden so liberally that the purpose of the test
— to ensure that directors do not unduly infringe on shareholder rights — was defeated.
The Household board adopted a rights plan that infringed on shareholders' rights more
than was necessary to achieve the objective sought by the board. Although the Unocal
test should prevent such an invasion of shareholder rights, the Moran court's application
of Unocal did not protect shareholder rights.
The Moran court's lenient application of Unocal's threshold test permits a corporate
board to perpetuate its control of a corporation, to usurp shareholders' rights to receive
Moran's and that so long as the directors were validly exercising their business judgment, the
incidental harms complained of were without remedy. Id. at 1082.
55
	 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985).
56 Id. at 1350.
" 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
58 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
" Id. at 1357.
6° Coercive two-tier tender offers are a means by which an acquirer may purchase 100% of a
public corporation's outstanding stock. Using this strategy, the offeror makes an attractive cash bid
for a bare majority of shares (for example, 51%) in the first tier of purchases, and once the stock
is no longer actively trading on the stock market, the offeror forces out the remaining shareholders
at a lower bail-out price in the second tier. Shareholders are coerced into selling in the first tier for
fear they will be forced out in the second tier. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
fi' Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352.
62 Id. at 1355-56.
65 Id. at 1356.
' Id. at 1350.
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and accept tender offers, and to deny shareholders their vote on fundamental decisions
regarding the corporate structure and existence. This reallocation of decisionmaking
power upsets corporate democracy and inverts the corporate structure. Under Moran,
directors can escape judicial review of their breaches of the fiduciafy duty owed to
shareholders, including the breach arising from directors' actions taken to retain their
control of the corporation. A board is able, under the standard of review applied in
Moran, unilaterally and indirectly to effect changes and make decisions which should
require authorization by a shareholder majority.
This casenote begins with a background discussion of judicial approaches to the
actions of a board of directors confronted with hostile takeover attempts. The section
examines the various adaptations of the business judgment rule that courts have applied
to directors' defensive decisions, focusing on the directors' level of interest and the
corresponding burden of proof which courts impose on the directors. The background
section then discusses the unique judicial concerns associated with poison pill rights
plans. Section two presents the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Moran v. Household
International, Inc." Section three analyzes the Moran opinion in light of the Unocal
precedent, which the court attempted to follow. This section suggests that the Moran
court applied Unocal leniently, and discusses the harms that arise under a lenient appli-
cation of the Unocal standard — the infringements on shareholder rights.
L BASES FOR SCRUTINIZING TAKEOVER DEFENSES
Under the business judgment rule, courts will not hold the directors of a corporation
liable for mistakes of judgment in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross overreaching,66
if the directors can show reasonable grounds for believing their action was in the best
interests of the corporation. 67 Through this rule, courts have created a presumption that
the directors' action was undertaken in good faith, after reasonable investigation, and in
the company's best interests. 68 A party challenging a board's decision must prove the
directors acted in bad faith to overcome the presumption. 69
Courts generally refuse to review a board's valid exercise of business judgment in
day-to-day transactions when shareholders are dissatisfied with the results of those
judgments. 7° This policy, the embodiment of the business judgment rule, is appropriate
because directors are agents whom shareholders elect to manage the daily business and
affairs of the corporation. 7 ' When directors become involved in making ownership
decisions for shareholders, however, they no longer share common interests with the
shareholders. Shareholders generally seek profits, while directors may seek to retain
their positions. Therefore, in making ownership decisions, the directors may be acting
beyond their authority7a and be interfering with shareholder democracy and property
rights. 79
65 500 A.2d 1396 (Del. 1985).
€6 Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966).
67
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
he Id.
69 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
70 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
926 (1979).
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983).
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984).
73 See id. The Norlin court noted that lw]hile the day-to-day affairs of a company are to be
650	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:641
Given this potential conflict of interests between shareholders and directors in the
context of hostile takeovers, commentators have debated over whether courts should
invoke the business judgment rule and defer to directors' decisions relating to takeover
contests where the board acts to avert hostile acquisition attempts." Two divergent views
of this issue would support different levels of judicial review. If courts view directors
whose positions are at stake in a control contest as having a vital personal interest in
making the corporation takeover-proof, then instead of deferring to the directors' judg-
ments, the court will apply an "intrinsic fairness test" to ensure that the directors have
dealt fairly with all parties involved in the transaction. 75 If, however, courts view directors
as facing only a minor conflict of interest not much greater than that which usual
transactions might invite, then the courts will regard the directors' action with a lower
level of scrutiny, such as that represented by the business judgment rule.'"
Initially, when confronting a shareholder challenge to a board's defensive action,
courts scrutinize directors' defensive actions to ensure that the directors acted to further
business and not personal interests." In conducting this test, courts first examine whether
a proper business purpose exists to justify the board action,'" For example, the adoption
of a defensive mechanism to avert a clear danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
has a valid business purpose." Conversely, action for the sole or primary purpose of
entrenchment of management has no proper purpose. If directors can show no other
purpose for their action, a court will strictly scrutinize the effects of that decision, possibly
finding that directors breached their fiduciary duty owed to shareholders. 80
Those courts holding that directors have no conflict of interest in control contests
may presume good faith when any rational purpose can be attributed to a board's
action.'" This standard, whereby a court will impute any rational purpose to the board's
action, places a heavy burden on the plaintiff' challenging the board. In recent years,
several states, including Delaware, have asserted that this lenient standard is insufficient
managed by its officers under the supervision of directors, decisions affecting a corporation's
ultimate destiny are for the shareholders to make in accordance with democratic procedures." Id.
See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of shareholder democracy.
74 See Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in .Takeover Contests,
I I SEC:. REG. L.J. 44, 72 (1983) ("[w]hile the business judgment rule may in some circumstances
serve to insulate certain of recalcitrant management's actions from judicial review, if interpreted
properly, it well may advance the best interests of both the shareholders and management's - other
constituencies"); Easterbrook Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 3, at 1162 ("corporate directors
should not be entitled to interfere with the relationship between offerors and the shareholders to
whom their offers arc directed"); Herzel, Schmidt Sc Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to
Resist Tender Offers, 3 Cola.. L. REV. 107, 116 (1980) ("[P]rohibiting the directors from interfering
with tender offers would wholly eliminate the director's negotiating posture as an element in the
involuntary acquisition process and severely weaken the competitive position of target companies
and their shareholders Such prohibition] could also severely damage other participants in the
corporation such as employees, customers, and creditors").
75 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
77 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
" See Joy v. North, 629 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
79 41 Del. Ch. at 496, 199 A.2d at 554-55; see also Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556,
569 (Del. Ch. 1977) (business judgment rule protects directors' actions taken in response to "a clear
threat to the future business or the existing, successful business policy").
89 Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975).
n' See, e.g., Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
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to protect shareholders. 82
 Thus, those courts have begun to tighten restrictions on
directors' actions and promote shareholder interests in the context of takeover contests."
The following sections discuss the various considerations a court confronts in re-
viewing a board's decision to adopt a rights plan as a defense against hostile takeovers.
When reviewing directorial actions intended to avert hostile takeovers, a court must first
determine whether the directors have a personal interest in their decision such that their
action must be strictly scrutinized. 84
 Next, the court must ensure that the board acted
for a proper business purpose and within the scope of its authority." Finally, the court
must review the rights plan's reasonableness — in light of its impact upon the corpora-
tion, the shareholders, and potential tender offerors — in relation to its alleged pur-
pose. 86
A. Directors' "Interest" in Control Contests
Courts have imposed a fiduciary duty on corporate directors to act with undivided
loyalty for the benefit of the corporation. 87
 Directors breach this duty when they inten-
tionally or otherwise manipulate the corporation to serve their own interests to the
exclusion or detriment of the shareholders." Hostile acquisitions present a threat to the
positions of the directors and senior management of a target corporation. Therefore,
when directors act to avert these takeover attempts, they may be motivated by either
personal or corporate objectives. 89
When directors have a personal and pecuniary interest in a transaction, they are
held to an extraordinary standard of proving the intrinsic fairness of their actions to all
parties who have an interest. 9° This situation exists, for example, when a director sells
property to a corporation. In these circumstances, the burden of proof shifts from the
plaintiff challenging a directors' action, to the defendant director.°I
By preventing a hostile takeover, directors also protect their board positions. Even
where a defense adopted is clearly in the best interests of the corporation, the directors'
actions are tainted by a conflict of interest because they enjoy a benefit, the retention of
82 See Chef'', 41 Del. Ch. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554 (quoting Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22,
187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)); Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 3, at 1164; see also Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
85
 See, e.g., Norlin, 744 F.2d at 258 (applying New York law); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del. 1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
84 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
xs Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
"4 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
3' H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 235, at 626 (3d ed. 1983) (citing Litwin
v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940)).
98
 Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH)
¶ 95,863, at 91,137 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976).
89 See Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962). Directors often have ties
to the corporation beyond their directorship. Many directors are members of management or of
directly related companies or firms with which the target company does business. See E. HERMAN,
CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 36-39 (1981).
9° Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719-20.
91
 Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971).
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their offices, which is not generally enjoyed by the corporation and its shareholders. 92
Therefore, by rejecting the takeover, the directors further. their personal interests."
Since bidders seeking to acquire control of a company generally must make an offer
that exceeds the current market value of a target's stock, shareholders' desire to receive
takeover premiums may conflict with directors' desire to retain their offices. Despite the
possible conflict of interests, courts generally hold that the directors' interest in retaining
their positions is not a self-dealing interest of the same magnitude as a director's sale of
personally owned property to the corporation. 94 Therefore, most courts do not apply
the intrinsic standard in the takeover context, but rather resort to a modified business
judgment rule standard, such as that established in Unocal, where directors were required
to satisfy a threshold test. 95
Irrespective of the fact that directors will further their personal interests, in some
situations directors have a duty to oppose takeover attempts which would be detrimental
to the well-being of the corporation." This may be required even at the expense of the
short-term interests of the shareholders. 97 Directors are, therefore, subject to conflicting
duties: they must not act in their self-interest, yet they must oppose acquisitions not in
the best interests of the corporation. In certain instances, the directors' self-interest in
retaining control may coincide with their duty to oppose acquisitions not in the corpo-
ration's best interest. Because these interests may coincide, courts have held that directors
breach their fiduciary duty only when retention of control was the sole or primary
purpose of their action." Therefore, evidence that the retention of control was one of
the results of, or even one of the motivating factors of, the board's decision does not by
itself constitute a showing of bad faith."
Judicial review of directors' defensive actions can thus be classified into three cate-
gories. The strictest review, the intrinsic fairness test, is applied when directors engage
in a transaction in which they have a personal and pecuniary interest. Generally this
scrutiny is reserved for situations where a director actually buys or sells assets from or
to the corporation and requires directors to prove the intrinsic fairness of the transaction
to all interested parties.L99 At the other extreme is the business judgment rule. According
to this rule, which courts apply to transactions where the court has no reason to suspect
the directors have acted for personal or improper reasons, courts will defer to the
directors' business judgment and presume any directorial action was taken in good faith,
92 Royal Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder) FED. SF:C. L. REP. (CCH) 9 95,863, at 91,137.
98 See Bennett, 41 Del. Ch. at 22, 187 A.2d at 409.
98 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55; Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554.
9' See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The Unocal court found that "a board's duty [in addressing a
pending takeover hid] is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions
should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business
judgment." The court increased judicial examination at the threshold in recognition of the conflict
of interests. Id.
96 See supra note 6 for a description of the board's duty to oppose harmful tender offers. See
also Revlon, slip op. at 6-7 (where the Revlon board adopted a poison pill rights plan in the face of
a hostile bid which it "reasonably concluded was grossly inadequate," the court found the adoption
to be valid).
Panzer, 486 F. Supp. at 1195. .
se Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554. Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 293.
"Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 293.




after reasonable investigation, and in the best interests of the corporation." Once
afforded these presumptions of propriety, the directors bear no burden of proof. A
compromise standard, which falls somewhere between the strict scrutiny of the intrinsic
fairness test and the deferential treatment of the business judgment rule, is applied
when a plaintiff introduces evidence that the directors had a personal interest in the
transaction challenged, or that the directors were manipulating the corporation to
achieve personal gains not shared by the corporation generally. 1 D2 Courts are not uniform
in their allocation of burdens of proof in these circumstances.'"
B. Directors' Burden of Proof in Control Contests
A trio of circuit courts of appeals cases — Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 134 Treadway
Companies v. Care Corp.,'" and Johnson v. Trueblood,w6 have considered the question of
how to allocate properly burdens of proof in actions where shareholders contest directors'
adoption of defenses to prevent takeovers. In these cases, the parties challenging the
directors' actions bore the burden of proving fraud, bad faith, 107 or the predominance
101 See Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554.
102 See Royal Indus., [l976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 95,863, at 91,137.
1 °3 Block & Miller, supra note 74, at 49.
104 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). In Power (decided under
Delaware law), Marshall Field & Co., a target for acquisition by Carter Hawley Hale (CHH),
negotiated leases for properties that would cause antitrust problems for CHH if CHH succeeded
in its acquisition attempt. Id, at 278. Marshall Field shareholders brought suit against the directors
and the corporation for violation of S.E.C. laws and state law fiduciary duties in connection with
the withdrawn CHH offer. Id. at 299. The court directed a verdict for the defendants because
plaintiffs presented no evidence of bad faith, overreaching, self-dealing, or any other fraud nec-
essary to shift the burden of justification of the transactions to the defendants. Id. The court found
that the uncontroverted evidence showed that the acquisitions were in line with the target's plans
for long-term development and that the directors did not profit from their own wrongdoing. Id. at
297.
1 " 5 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980). The Treadway court (interpreting New Jersey law) reviewed
Treadway Companies' sale of 230,000 shares of stock to a white knight, preparatory to a merger
which occurred immediately after a third party, Care Corp., acquired a large block of Treadway
common stock. Id. at 360. The trial court found a breach of fiduciary duty in the directors' haste
in negotiating the friendly merger and in their failure to make a good-faith consideration of the
tender offer by Care. Id. at 373. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed in
their initial burden of proving the directors' interest or bad faith. Id. at 383. The court of appeals
stated:
[T]he Treadway board was simply not acting to maintain its own control over the
corporation. Rather, in approving the stock sale, they were moving Treadway toward
a business combination with Fair Lanes ... Moreover, Care made no showing that the
directors other than Lieblich had any personal interest in having the merger consum-
mated.
Id.
m 629 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). In Johnson v. Trueblood
(construing Delaware law), the minority shareholders brought suit against the majority shareholders,
who comprised a majority of' the board of directors, for acting against the corporate interest for
the personal motive of entrenching their power. Id. at 292. The court required the plaintiff to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the directors acted for the sole or primary purpose
of retaining control. The court declared that it would uphold the action so long as it could be
attributed to any rational purpose. Id.
107 Panter, 646 F.2d at 294: Treadway, 638 F.2c1 at 383 (placing the initial burden upon plaintiff
to prove the directors' interest, bad faith or improper purpose).
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of impermissible motives." Irrespective of the takeover context, these courts would not
interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors in the absence
of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion.'°
In the 1986 federal case of Hanson Trust v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc.,"°. the Second
Circuit, construing New York law, explicitly stated that the initial burden of proving
directors' breach of fiduciary duty in averting a hostile takeover rests with the plaintiff."'
The court shifted the burden, however, once the plaintiff had demonstrated that the
directors' action was not fair to the corporation, and had shown that the directors
breached their duty of care." 2
 The court then required the board to prove the fairness
of the action."3
Although these majority opinions from the federal courts placed the initial burden
of going forward with evidence upon the plaintiff challenging directorial actions, two of
these opinions, were accompanied by extensive dissents condemning the deference with
which the courts treated the interested directors."' In Punter, Judge Cudahy "emphati-
cally disagree[d] that the business judgment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly
to fend off a threat to their control, with an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound
business judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad
faith or abuse of discretion." 13
 Judge Rosenn, in Johnson v. Trueblood, sought to shift to
the defendant directors the burden of going forward with the evidence to justify the
transaction as primarily in the corporation's best interest, once a plaintiff had shown
that the desire to retain control was one of the directors' motivating factors. 16
Delaware state courts historically have diverged from the federal court majority
view, and their decisions more closely resemble the dissents of Judges Cudahy and
Rosenn. In the 1962 case of Bennett v. Propp,'" for example, the Delaware Supreme
Court, deeming the board of directors to be inherently interested in retaining control,
required the board to demonstrate a proper business purpose for their purchase of a
large block of their own common stock." 8
 By requiring the board to go forward with
1 " Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 292.
1°2 Punter, 646 F.2d at 293.
n° 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
"I Id. at 273.
12 1d. at 272. In Hanson, the directors granted the white knight an option at less than fair
market value. The option precluded the hostile offeror from acquiring the corporation, even though
his bid price was higher than that of the white knight. Id.
" 2 1d. at 278.
", In the Hanson case, the court ultimately shifted the burden to the directors, but only after
the plaintiff made a substantial showing that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties. The
opinion was accompanied by a dissent which, unlike the aforementioned federal cases, favored the
directors. While the majority ruled for the plaintiffs and found that the directors did not satisfy
their burden, the dissent found that the burden which the majority imposed was too severe. Id. at
289 (Oakes, J., dissenting), The dissent proposed that the directors' action should have been
deferred to once it was proven free of any self-interest, fraud, and bad faith because it was
reasonable for the directors to rely on the recommendations of financial advisors. Id. The majority
found that the directors breached their duty of care because they unreasonably relied on reports
of advisors. Id. at 273.
646 F.2d at 299 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
18 629 F.2d at 301 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
"' 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
118 Id. at 22, 187 A.2d at 409. In the suit against the corporation and the directors, the chairman
of the board alone was held liable because he covertly and without authority made the stock
purchases and "practically admitted" that the purchases were made to preserve control. Id. at 20,
187 A.2d at 408.
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evidence of a proper purpose, the Bennett court, in 1962, shifted the burden of proof
to the board, a step .that Judge Cudahy in Panter and Judge Rosenn in Johnson unsuc-
cessfully attempted to have their courts take years later.
The shifting of the burden established in Bennett was followed two years later in
Cheff v. Mathes.' 19 The Cheff court granted the directors business judgment rule protection
only after they had satisfied an initial burden of demonstrating a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness from which they sought to defend the corporation. 120 The court
distinguished the burden placed on these directors from that which would be placed on
directors selling property to their corporation, because these directors did not have the
same self-dealing interest. Whereas a director selling property would have to prove the
intrinsic fairness of his dealings, the court stated, these directors needed only to satisfy
a lesser standard of proof. 12 ' The court also distinguished between directors related to
the corporation only through their directorship (disregarding the ownership of common
stock in the corporation), from those with a clear pecuniary interest, such as an executive
of the corporation or the corporation's attorney.I 22 The court stated that it would not
hold the former to the same standard of proof required of directors having a personal
and pecuniary interest in the transaction.'"
The Cheff court declared that perpetuation of control is an improper motive for
director action, but action motivated by a sincere belief that a defense is necessary to
maintain what the board believed to be proper business practices would be protected by
the business judgment rule.'" To satisfy the Cheff burden of showing reasonable grounds
to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, the directors needed
only to show good faith and reasonable investigation. 125 The directors in Cheff presented
sufficient evidence, based upon long-standing business policies of the corporation and
the reputation of the acquirer, for the court to conclude that they reasonably believed
in the presence of a threat to the future of the company in its present form. 126 Therefore,
the Cheff court afforded the directors' judgment a presumption of good faith under the
business judgment rule. 127
The 1971 decision of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Lewis' 28 weakened the burden Cheff had
placed on interested directors. In the absence of directors' self-dealing, the Sinclair court
" 9 Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 504-05, 199 A.2d at 554.
120 Id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
121 Id. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554-55.
122 Id.
122 Id.
124 Id. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554 (citing Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960)).
122 Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
In Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556.
127 Id.
128 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). Although Sinclair did not involve a hostile takeover, it did implicate
a potential breach of fiduciary duty by "interested" directors who were in an analogous position to
that of directors in a takeover defense. The action in Sinclair was brought by minority shareholders
of a subsidiary against the parent corporation for damages sustained by the subsidiary due to the
parent's decision to have the subsidiary pay excessive dividends, thereby denying it any opportunity
for expansion. Id. at 719. The court found that the parent so decided due to its need for money,
but found no breach of fiduciary duty because the minority holders were treated fairly. Id. at 721.
The Sinclair court defined self-dealing, in the context of a parent-subsidiary transaction, as a
situation where "the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to
act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and
detriment to, the minority shareholders of the subsidiary." Id. at 720.
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held that it would not review business decisions by informed directors unless plaintiffs
showed improper motives, fraud or gross overreaching on the part of the directors.'"
Under this standard, courts would defer to the directors' judgment if a board decision
could be attributed to any rational business purpose, thereby freeing the board from
having to defend or even go forward with evidence to justify their actions.'" The Sinclair
"any attributable purpose" test proved too lenient, however, where directors sought to
protect their companies from takeovers, because of the inherent danger that the directors
could be acting for selfish purposes. 13 1 Where the Cheff court's application of the business
judgment rule required directors to show good faith once a plaintiff introduced evidence
that the directors had personal interests in a transaction, the Sinclair court was willing
to impute a good faith purpose if any such purpose could be construed.
Responding to the problems inherent in the lenient Sinclair standard, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,I 32
 increased the burden placed on
directors. Under Unocal, directors were, at the threshold, required to show a valid
purpose for adopting a takeover defense before business judgment rule protection would
be conferred.' 33
 Furthermore, the court required the directors to show that the measure
adopted was reasonable in relation to their stated purpose. '''
I n Unocal, the board of the target company sought to protect the corporation from
what it determined was a grossly inadequate and coercive two-tier takeover. "5 The Unocal
board adopted a discriminatory self-tender plan to subsidize the shareholders who would
otherwise be forced to accept "junk bonds" — bonds of dubious value representing
subordinated debt with poor ratings) 36
 The self-tender plan was discriminatory because
the board would purchase the corporation's shares from any holder except Mesa, the
party extending the coercive offer.'" In reviewing the board's action, the Unocal court
placed a two-part burden upon the Unocal board, which it was required to satisfy in
order to qualify for the business judgment rule presumptions of good faith, reasonable
investigation, and acting in the best interests of the corporation. First, the board was
required to show reasonable grounds for believing that a threat to corporate policy or
effectiveness existed.'" The board presented, and the court discussed in detail, the
board's grounds for believing that the tender offer presented was grossly inadequate
and coercive, such that shareholders might be forced to accept an unfavorable ex-
Id. at 722.
," Id. at 720.
See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ("Because of the omnipresent spectre that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests ... there is an enhanced duty" requiring the board to justify its
action.).
"2 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
ass Id. at 954-55.
l" Id. at 955.
," Id. at 956. Coercive two-tier takeovers generally comprise an offer of a cash premium to a
bare majority of shareholders followed by an exchange forced upon the remaining minority share-
holders at a low price. Id. In Unocal, the offeror, Mesa Petroleum, offered $54 per share for 37%
of Unocal's outstanding stock and intended in the second tier to eliminate the remaining publicly
held shares by exchanging securities "purportedly worth $54 per share." Id. at 949. The securities
offered were highly subordinated and "rather aptly termed ... Junk bonds.'" Id. at 949-50.
,56
 Id. at 956.
' 57 1d. at 951.
Id. at 955.
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change.'" The Unocal court noted the inequity of the exchange to which shareholders
would be subjected if the takeover attempt were successful." 0 The court found that the
board's purpose, to defeat the inadequate offer or to provide shareholders with an
equitable exchange, was a sufficient purpose to justify a defensive action."'
The second part of the directors' burden was a required showing that the adopted
measure was reasonable in relation to the stated threat."' 4 After establishing the board's
authority under Delaware law to make a discriminatory self-tender offer,m the court
analyzed the effect of the measure on shareholders and on Mesa, the acquirer.l ." The
court noted that the board's defensive measure would provide shareholders, who might
suffer from the inadequacy of the second tier of Mesa's tender offer, the substantial
equivalent of what they held before the tender offer." 6 The court further noted that
the plan needed to be discriminatory in order to avoid benefiting Mesa, who would
mistreat the shareholders.' 46 The board's duty, the court declared, was to ensure that
the minority shareholders receive equal value for their shares. 147 Thus, the board's action
was reasonable, the court stated, because it offered a fair value to those shareholders
who would otherwise have suffered from Mesa's offer. 14" Finding that the board had
satisfied the two-part test, the court invoked the business judgment rule presumptions
that the hoard had properly exercised its business judgment, and upheld the board's
action without further scrutiny.""
Unocal represents the final product of Delaware's gradual development of a test
appropriate for reviewing the actions of directors' adopting defenses against hostile
takeovers. The Unocal test is a compromise standard between the strict scrutiny of an
intrinsic fairness test and the lack of scrutiny under the traditional business judgment
rule. The test allows a court to make a threshold review of crucial aspects of a defensive
measure and thereby ensure its overall reasonableness to the parties affected. The Unocal
court, however, went further than just seeking reasonableness. The court looked to the
fairness of the transaction, specifically noting that the directors' defensive action was
consistent with the directorial role of ensuring that minority shareholders receive the
substantial equivalent in value that they would have received but for the directors' action
and the coercive tender offer.'" This review of actual value equivalence represents a
substantive review, in contrast with procedural reviews which would test only whether
the directors acted in good faith for a proper purpose. This search for fairness dem-
onstrates the Delaware courts' increasing willingness to delve deeper into the substance
of business transactions.
1" Id. at 956.
I-10
", Id. at 956-57.
"2 Id. at 955.
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
corporation may purchase ..
114 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 9
," Id. (quoting Sterling
(1952)).
16 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 9 56.
"7 1d, at 957.
' 48 Id. at 956-57.
"9 1d. at 958.
150 Id. at 956.
60(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "Every
and with its own shares." Id.
33 Del. Ch. 293, 306, 93 A.2d 107, 114
, § 160(a)(1) (1983). Section
. use and otherwise deal in
56.
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp,,
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C. Substantive Judicial Review of Directors' Actions
When a court invokes the business judgment rule it affords directors a presumption
of propriety, thereby glossing over the substance of the board's judgment. 161 An intrinsic
fairness test, at the other extreme, is a complete substantive review which ensures that
all interested parties are treated fairly. 162 The Unocal court's concern with substantive
fairness demonstrates the trend in Delaware case law of increasing scrutiny of directors'
decisions that infringe on shareholders' rights. 153 In Aronson v. Lewis,' 54 for example, the
Delaware Supreme Court looked into the substance of the directors' actions rather than
relying on the presumption of the business judgment rule in considering plaintiff's
failure to make a demand of the board to address an alleged wrong prior to filing a
derivative suit against the corporation.' 55 The court held that if, under the facts alleged,
there is reasonable doubt that the directors are disinterested and independent and that
the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment,
then demand of the board would be excused. 156 In determining the propriety of the
board's action, the Aronson court analyzed the substantive nature of the challenged
transaction. 157 Thus, the Aronson decision reflects the court's willingness and obligation
to look beyond the illusive motivational test and to conduct searching reviews of proce-
dures and outcomes.
This substantive scrutiny has carried into the law of freeze-out mergers. 168 In a
freeze-out merger, a majority shareholder eliminates all remaining publicly held shares
of the corporation's common stock. Since, at the time of the elimination, the stock is
generally no longer traded on the market, the acquirer is free to set his forced buy-out
price. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., for example, the Delaware Supreme Court proposed
a fairness test for parent-subsidiary mergers where directors sit on both boards, and
required the board to demonstrate its good faith and the "entire fairness" of the bar-
gain.' 6° The court defined "entire fairness" as a two-part test of fair dealing and fair
price.' 60 The Weinberger decision specifically eliminated the business purpose test for
freeze-out mergers, 161 and provided for scrutiny of the board's actions. Applying this
strict test, the court found the board had not dealt fairly with the stockholders 162 and
161 See id.
152
 See Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
155 Compare Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (making two inquiries, one into
the independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the substantive nature
of the alleged transaction) with Zapata Corp, v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784, 784 n.I0 (Del.
1981) (applying the business judgment rule presumptions of propriety to the board's refusal to act
pursuant to a stockholder's demand on the board). Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 715 (Del. 1983) (throwing out the business purpose test applied by Singer to a freeze -out
merger and adopting a fairness test) with Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977)
(focusing its review of a freeze-out merger on the propriety of the board's alleged purpose).
164 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
' 55 Id. at 814.
' 56 1d.
157 Id.
' 58 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11.
169 467 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983) (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch.
293, 93 A,2d 107 (1952)).
160
 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
161 Id. at 715.
162 Id. at 712.
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remanded the case for a determination of damages based upon entire fairness stan-
dards.'"
In addition to enhancing shareholder protection from interested directors through
rigorous new tests, as in Aronson v. Lewis' 64 and Weinberger v. UOP, inc.,' 65 the Delaware
courts have also strictly enforced traditional tests, such as the duty of care requiring
directors to make informed decisions. In the 1985 case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,I 66 for
example, directors were held personally liable for their gross negligence in failing to act
with informed and reasonable deliberation.'°' Although the duty of care was not revised,
strict enforcement of traditional duties of care and the finding of personal liability
demonstrate the court's careful scrutiny of directors' actions.
In Van Gorkom, the board approved a cash-out merger, an outsider's offer to pur-
chase all outstanding shares of the corporation for cash and merge the target company
with the acquirer.'" The board's decision to approve the merger was made after two
hours of consideration, and the board relied primarily on a twenty minute presentation
by one of the directors who had negotiated the deal with the offeror. 16" The other
directors viewed no written summary or documentation to support the price offered,
and approved an unseen agreement which was explained by the director who was
personally involved in the transaction.' 7° The Van Gorkom court refused to defer to the
directors' uninformed judgment."' The directors' failure to be informed, the court held,
was a breach of the fiduciary duty directors owe shareholders."' According to the court,
this duty required more than the absence of had faith; 173 the directors were bound to
an affirmative duty to protect the interests of the shareholders and assess all information
critically.'"
These cases demonstrate the increased scrutiny with which Delaware courts are
reviewing directors' actions. They represent a trend of increased protection of share-
holder interests, and a willingness by the courts to restrict directors' autonomy. Under
these standards, courts require directors to respect and advance shareholder rights.
D. Interaction of Federal Law with State Corporation Law
While the standard of review which a court applies to directors' defensive reactions
to hostile takeovers is a reflection of the state's corporation statute and its common law,
courts may also consider a standard of shareholder protection which Congress has
codified in federal securities law. 175 State corporation laws are generally regarded as
enabling acts protecting management decisions and providing flexibility to facilitate
16, Id. at 714.
le" 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
1 fi5 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
'69
	
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
167 Id. at 872.
'" Id. at 874.
' 69 Id. at 874-78, 878 n.19.
' 70 Id. at 874.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 893.
175 1d.
' 74 Id.
176 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
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business transactions. "G
 Many commentators criticize the inadequacy of state law as an
instrument of corporate control)" While proposals have arisen for federalizing corpo-
ration law, 178
 no such preemption has yet occurred.
Federal law has, in some areas, entered the field of corporate law to provide specific
shareholder protections. The Williams Act, amending the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 174
 for example, speaks in clear terms of shareholder protection. The Williams Act
provides that no party involved in making a tender offer shall engage in acts that are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative) 80
 Courts have interpreted the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 as merely a standard of disclosure,'" but in the legislative history
to the Williams Act, Congress made clear its desire to protect shareholders' ability to
receive and consider tender offers by promoting a policy of evenhandedness)B2
 Congress
sought a balance between the powers of directors and tender offerors such that neither
could unduly influence the shareholder, the proper party for deciding the success of a
lender offer.'"
In the 1982 case of Edgar v. MITE Corp.,'" the United States Supreme Court,
alluding to the congressional intent to protect shareholders, found a state statute regu-
lating takeovers to be invalid. 185
 According to the Court, Congress intended, by the
passage of the Williams Act, to protect shareholders by keeping them fully informed
and by preventing either management or a bidder from obtaining an unfair advantage
over the other such that they could frustrate the shareholder's exercise of free choice)"
Therefore, the MITE Court struck down an Illinois precommencement notification
statute which, in the Court's view, gave management an unfair advantage in takeover
hattles. 187
 The MITE decision thus provides the states with a model for following the
congressional mandate manifested in the Williams Act. Moreover, state courts are in a
position to provide, through the enforcement of common law duties of loyalty and care
owed by directors to shareholders, the shareholder protection sought by Congress.
This high level of protection, implicitly proposed in the Williams Act, has been
provided under state law, for example, in the 1984 case of Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace
Inc.'" In Norlin, the Second Circuit, interpreting New York law, emphasized the impor-
' 76 Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991, 991
(1976).
' 77 Id. (citations omitted) ("[Tille inadequacy of these statutes as instruments of corporate control
is common knowledge . ...").
' 78
 Two congressional proposals concerning federalizing corporate law include S. 2567, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (the proposed Federal Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act) and H.R.
701(}, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (the proposed Federal Corporate Democracy Act). Both proposals
attempted to define the directors' duty of loyalty and duty of care, as well as to set requirements
for a majority of independent directors.
' 79
 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)—(f) (1982).
'S° Id. at § 7811(0.
' 8 ' See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
'" S. R. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
' 81
 See generally id.; H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.; reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Au. NEWS 2811.
1 "4
 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
1 " Id. at 633.
188 Id. at 635.
187 Id. at 645.
' 88
 744 F.2d 255 (24 Cir. 1984) (applying New York law).
May 1986]	 CASENOTES	 661
lance of protecting the fundamental structure of corporate governance and traditional
shareholder democracy.'" The court held that decisions regarding a corporation's ulti-
mate destiny are properly made by the shareholders.'" Where the board action was
intended to shift control of the corporation in favor of the board, the Norlin court
required the board to demonstrate that the transaction was fair and served the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 19 ' The Norlin court's powerful advocacy
for shareholder interests represents a stronger form of shareholder protection than
generally provided by state law. The Norlin decision complements and enforces congres-
sional intent as found in the Williams Act by strictly enforcing directorial duties.
Congressional intent is not the sole basis available to Delaware courts for justifying
an increase in shareholder protection. A more concrete source of guidance may be found
in the Delaware General Corporation Law. For example, section 159 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law 192
 deems stock to be personal property and guarantees share-
holders the right to transfer their interests, unless under section 202, the shareholder
agrees to a restriction.'" Shareholders also have the right to protect their investment by
voting on certain corporate actions pursuant to section 212.' 94
 Thus, strict judicial scru-
tiny of corporate directors is neither novel nor extreme; indeed, strict scrutiny, as
suggested by the congressional intent underlying the Williams Act, is merely adherence
to the language of state corporate law.
E. The Nature of "Poison Pills"
The "poison pill" — the preferred share purchase rights plan — distinguishes Moran
v. Household International, inc. 1 "' from earlier judicial tests of director's good faith. Rights
plans, although new and controversial, offer a board of directors many advantages over
other defensive measures. One obvious advantage is the low cost of enacting a rights
plan. The only expenses associated with its adoption are the legal and financial services
costs required to formulate it and explain it to the board)" A second advantage is the
ease of adoption — the measure may be adopted by board resolution without shareholder
approval.'"' A third benefit is the flexibility which a rights plan gives the board in
determining how lethal the poison should be. The terms may be designed to protect
shareholders against inadequate offers by guaranteeing a fair price through a redemp-
' 99 Id. at 258.
' 9° Id.
19 ' Id. at 265.
199 DEL. Cone ANN. Lit. 8, § 159 (1983). Section 159 provides in part: "The shares of stock in
every corporation shall be deemed personal property and transferable ... ." Id.
' 93 Id. at § 202. Section 202 provides in part: "No restriction, so imposed shall be binding .
unless the holders of the securities are party to an agreement or voted in favor of the restriction."
Id.
194 Id. § 212. Section 212 provides in part: "[U]nless otherwise provided in the certificate of
incorporation ... each stockholder shall be entitled to one vote for each share of capital stock held
by such stockholder." Id.
'" 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
I" The duty of reasonable investigation, clearly illustrated in Smith v. Van Gorham, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985), would implicate directors adopting a defense plan without being reasonably familiar
with its workings.
197 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1983) (authorizing a board to create, adopt and issue new
classes of securities by board resolution).
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lion, conversion, or flip-over provision. Alternatively, a rights plan may be formulated
to prevent all offers by demanding an unreasonable reward for shareholders, such as a
two-for-one exchange provision.
The most vital benefit accruing to directors from rights plans is the directors' ability
to redeem the rights. The directors are able to negotiate tender offers for shareholders,
rejecting any or all, while shareholders remain powerless to reap the benefits of tender-
offer premiums. Should the directors decide not to redeem the rights upon request by
an offeror, the board can prevent a takeover by their inaction. This decision not to
redeem the rights is difficult for courts to review, because there may be no evidence of
the board's basis for deciding not to redeem rights upon request of a tender offeror.
The question of redeeming the rights need not even arise in a board meeting, where
the decision would be recorded in the corporate minutes, as opposed to the adoption of
a rights plan, which courts can review by analyzing the terms of the written product, the
rights plan itself, and by reviewing the board's discussion surrounding the adoption as
recorded in the corporate minutes.
In the 1979 case of Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, the first legal challenge to a poison pill
preferred stock defensive plan, the Court of Chancery of Delaware held that the secu-.
rities issued by the target corporation's board did not qualify as preferred stock, and
that the board was not authorized to issue them. 199 Because the target had sought to
alter the voting rights of the shareholders, the court granted an injunction against the
plan. 199 The securities were labeled preferred shares and were to be issued as a stock
dividend. The court found that the stated dividend and liquidation preferences were
illusory, and that therefore the stock was not a preferred stock. 20° The only true pref-
erence the stock granted was a vote in those situations which required a supermajority
vote of 80% to approve any business combination or transaction with any party owning
20% or more of the outstanding voting stock of the company. 2" The voting rights were
ineffective if the board approved the transaction.
The Telvest controversy focused on the preferred plan's alteration in the voting
power of common stock, and on whether this same manipulation which could be effected
by an amendment to the certificate of incorporation, could also be accomplished by
board resolution without shareholder approval. 202 The court noted that the corporation's
certificate of incorporation 2" and section 151 of the Delaware Code, which enabled
directors to create and issue securities with such terms as the board should adopt by
resolution, 204 permitted the board to modify common stock voting rights by issuing
192 Telvest, Inc, v. Olson, No. 5798, slip op. at 12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979),
1" Id. at 16.
2°" Id. at 13. The terms of the preferred stock guaranteed that preferred dividends or liqui-
dation payments would be paid prior to those payments on common stock, but the amounts received
in all cases would be the same. Id.





45 of the target corporation's certificate of incorporation stated:
The Board of Directors of the corporation is hereby expressly granted authority to
fix, by resolution duly adopted prior to the issuance of any shares of a particular series
of preferred stock so designated by the Board of Directors, the voting powers of such
stock of such series, if any, and the designations, preferences and relative, participating,
optional and other special rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
2" DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 8, § 157(a), (g) (1983).
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preferred stock with superior rights. 2p 5 Nevertheless, the court held the securities issued
invalid because of their sham nature and illusory terms. 206 The Telvest decision thus
raised the issue of whether Delaware law permitted the issuance of securities for nonfi-
nancial purposes such as antitakeover schemes.
In 1983, however, in National Education Corp. v, Bell & Howell Co., the Delaware
Court of Chancery approved the issuance of securities for nonfinancial purposes. 20
Distinguishing the Telvest decision, the National Education court explained that the Telvest
court's "sham" terminology implicated only the failure of the stated preferences of the
stock described. 205 The National Education court held that the preferred stock plan before
them did have real preferences beyond those relating to voting power and refused to
grant a preliminary injunction against the plan. 209 Although the court noted that a degree
of manipulation was inevitable when a board adopted a preferred plan, the court refused
to grant a preliminary injunction against implementation of the plan because the plaintiff
had not shown any improper manipulation of the corporation by the directors for the
purpose of entrenching incumbent management.2 l0
The National Education court, citing the Delaware legislature's amendment of section
151 211 as support for its action, concluded that the effect of the Telvest decision was
terminated. 212 National Education foreclosed further inquiry into whether securities could
be issued to existing shareholders for nonfinancial purposes as an antitakeover measure,
and thus laid the foundation for the expansion of defensive rights plans. 215 The amended
section 151 together with the National Education decision establish that poison pill pre-
ferred stocks are valid securities under Delaware law. 214
Attacks on boards adopting rights plans have also focused on the directors' authority
to enact such a measure. 215 Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
the statutory source for directors' authority, provides that It .lhe business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
205 Telvest, No. 5798, slip op. at 16.
206 Id. at 13.
No. 7278, slip op. at 1, 11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983).
2" Id. at 9-10.
20 Id. at 10.
2 L° Id.
m See 64 Del. Laws 112 (1983).
212 National Education, No. 7278, ship op. at 5.
212 Id. The National Education court did require that a preferred stock have real valid preferences
beyond mere voting rights, id. at 10, but this requirement is one of form, not substance. Because
the preferred rights granted will never be exercised according to their terms, a board may adopt
any terms which will satisfy the court's inquiry. Any terms adopted are meaningless because the
board can, by making the purchase of the preferred shares totally infeasible, insure that the rights
will never be exercised. Id.
214
	 National Education court, holding that a security may be authorized under Delaware law
even though its primary purpose is noneconomic, authorized the challenged preferred stock plan
under section 151. Id. at I I. Section 151 of the Delaware General Corporation Law grants a board
"blank check" powers (the power to create unilaterally any desired terms) for any type of security.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1983). Section 157 parallels the language of section 151 and empowers
the board to issue stock rights and options with the same blank check powers as are available for
other securities under section 151. Id. § 157. Pursuant to § 157, a board is authorized to create a
poison pill stock plan from preferred share purchase rights. Id.
215 See, e.g., Newell Co. v. Wm. E. Wright Co., No. 8161, slip op. at 1-2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1985).
664	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:641
direction of a board of directors." 216
 While this is a broad mandate, the powers granted
are not unlimited, as demonstrated by other statutory provisions granting shareholders
democratic voting power on questions concerning the ultimate destiny of the corpora-
tion.217 The "business and affairs" language of the statute defines a limit to the directors'
discretion. 21 " That limit does not include extraordinary transactions, those causing fun-
damental changes in the corporate structure. Extraordinary transactions are beyond
ordinary business, whose management is delegated to the board, and therefore require
shareholder approval. 213 The demarcation of the extent of management discretion dis-
tinguishes ordinary course of business decisions from those that fundamentally affect
the existence and purpose of the corporation. 22°
Courts defer to directors' judgment by invoking the business judgment rule pre-
sumptions of propriety when the board acts within its scope of authority. 221 Courts,
however, scrutinize directors' decisions regarding ownership questions where the share-
holders' and directors' common goal of profit maximization is subordinate and the
individual interests of directors and shareholders weigh heavily. 222 In regard to owner-
ship questions, section 141 does not authorize unilateral board action because share-
holder authorization is required. 223 Section 141, along with sections 151 and 157, enable
a board to issue securities for financial purposes, and, as National Education held, for
nonfinancial purposes."4 Section 141 also empowers a board to adopt takeover defenses
to protect the corporate enterprise. 225 The rationale of National Education indicates that
rights plans are not per se invalid, that is, their nonfinancial focus and corporate control
orientation do not preclude poison pill rights and preferred stock from being authorized
under the Delaware corporation statutes. Therefore, a shareholder seeking to enjoin a
board-adopted rights plan is forced to attack its reasonableness in relation to the circum-
stances facing the board, instead of attacking the rights themselves.
II. THE MORAN DF:CISION
In Moran v. Household Intirnational, Inc., 226 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a
board of directors' decision to adopt a poison pill rights plan. The court decided that a
rights plan would receive the business judgment rule presumptions that the decision was
made in good faith, after reasonable investigation, and in the best interests of the
'2 ' 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
2 ' 7 See, e.g., id. § 212 (shareholders' general right to vote); id. § 251 (shareholders' right to vote
on mergers and consolidations); id. § 271 (shareholders' right to vote on the sate, lease, or exchange
of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets); id. § 275 (shareholders' right to vote on any
proposed dissolution of the corporation).
218 Aronion, 473 A.2d at 813 (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 78286 (Del.
1981)).
219 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 87, § 340, at 952.
22° See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del.
1974).
221 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953-54.
222 Id. at 954-55.
223 See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of shareholders'
right to decide issues concerning the corporate existence.
22 '1 See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of National Education.
225 See I'anter, 646 F.2d at 299.
226 500 A.2(1. 1346 (Del. 1985).
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corporation, if, pursuant to the Unocal test, the rights plan was adopted in response to
a perceived threat to the corporation's policy or effectiveness and was reasonable in
relation to that threat. 22/ Applying the Unocal test in this instance, the court found that
a perceived general marketplace threat of coercive two-tier takeovers was a valid reason
for Household to adopt a poison pill rights plan with a two-for-one flip-over which
permitted a holder to purchase $200 worth of an acquirer's stock for $100. 228 Thus,
finding that the rights plan adopted by the Household board was an authorized and
reasonable defense mechanism,'" the court invoked the business judgment rule pre-
sumptions affording deference to the Household board's decision.'" The court further
noted that the board's duties under section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which provides that directors shall manage the business and affairs of the corpo-
ration, include a duty to determine whether a tender offer is in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders:23 ' Finding this duty substantially equivalent to other
directorial responsibilities, the court held that the business judgment rule should apply
equally to takeover defenses as it would to other board duties. 232
The court noted that decisions from many jurisdictions apply the business judgment
rule to actions intended to forestall hostile takeovers. 233 In this case, the court noted, the
defensive measure was prospective, designed to meet potential future takeover attempts,
not reactive to a particular threat."' The court held that prospectiveness would not
preclude application of the business judgment rule since prospective action eliminates
the risks associated with rash decisions made in the face of an imminent threat."' Thus,
the court determined, prospective actions may appropriately receive deference, provided
the action is within the board's authority.'"
The court found authority for the adoption of the Rights Plan under sections 151
and 157 of the Delaware Code. 237 Section 157 provides for the issuance of rights and
options entitling holders to purchase capital stock, 238 while section 151 provides for the
issuance of the underlying preferred stock. 239 The court rejected Moran's contention
that section 157 does not authorize takeover defenses, refusing to infer a limitation of
the potential functions of securities which appears neither in the language nor history
227 Id. at 1356.
223 Id. at 1357 (citing Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
229 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
230 Id. at 1357.
23 ' Id. at 1353.





23' Id. at 1351 n.7.
236
	
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1983). Section 157 provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every corporation may
create and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue and sale of any shares
of stock or other securities of the corporation, rights or options entitling the holders
thereof to purchase from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class
or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument or instru-
ments as shall be approved by the board of directors.
Id.
239 DEL. Cons: ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1983) (preferred stock may be issued by resolution of the
board).
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of the statute. 248 The court emphasized the need for corporate law to develop and
anticipate evolving concepts and needs, and the corresponding duty of courts to avoid
unduly strict construction of corporate statutes."'
Moran's contentions that the securities had no economic value, were not intended
to be exercised, and were a sham and therefore not authorized under section 157 because
of their illusory nature, were also rejected by the court. 242 The court found that the
rights would be exercised if triggered, and distinguished them from sham securities. 248
The preferred shares represented by the rights, when issuable, the court stated, would
possess real dividend and liquidation preferences." 4
The court also rejected Moran's argument that section 157 permits a board to issue
rights for the purchase of its own stock, but not that of another company, as provided
for in the flip-over provision of Household's Rights Plan. 248 The court analogized the
flip-over provision to an antidestruction provision, commonly used to insure the con-
tinuity of stockholders' investments when one publicly held corporation is acquired by
another, which is permitted under Delaware corporate law. 248 The court did not accept
Moran's distinction between the incidental nature of antidestruction clauses which pro-
vide for an equal exchange, and the intentionally defensive nature of the two-for-one
flip-over.247 Reasoning that the flip-over is an antidestruction provision applied to an
evolving need, the court upheld the provision. 248
The court then turned to Moran's contention that Household's reliance on section
157, which permits a board to issue stock rights, to validate an antitakeover device is
contradictory to the intent of section 203, a notice statute establishing procedural re-
quirements for tender offers. 248 Moran contended that since Delaware law has refrained
from imposing restrictions upon takeover activities, courts must infer that the legislature
intended that no party should impair shareholders' ability to receive tender offers. 28°
The court found that the legislators' intended scope of state law has no bearing on the
ability of private parties to impose greater restrictions, and concluded that the legislature
did not intend to impede private action. Furthermore, the court reasoned, the Rights
Plan was not a major impediment to tender offers."' Similarly, the court held that
authorizing the Rights Plan under section 157 did not violate the policies underlying the
Williams Act, and was not, therefore, unconstitutional as a violation of the federal
commerce clause. 282 The court noted Congress' intent to regulate only state action, and
20
 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351.
24'
	 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957).
242 Moran, 500 A,2d at 1352.
24s
	 The court noted the attempt by Sir James Goldsmith to acquire Crown Zellerbach. which
adopted a rights plan similar to Household's, and the resulting exercise of the rights issued pursuant
to the plan. Id.
244 Id.
242
246 An antidestruction provision is a conversion right which protects a shareholder's investment
when his corporation is acquired or merged with another by allowing him to exchange his shares
for those of the surviving corporation. Id.
247
248 Id .
242 Id, at 1352-53.
25° Id. at 1353.
2'' Id.
252 Id.
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found no relevance to Household's private action.'" The court reasoned that where a
state is involved in an action only to the extent that a private party acts in accordance
with its statutes, there is not sufficient state action to constitute a violation of the com-
merce clause or the supremacy clause?"
After concluding that Delaware General Corporation Law section 157 authorized
the issuance of securities such as those described by the Rights Plan, the court reviewed
the authority of the board to adopt the Rights Plan as a defensive measure.'" The court
noted that section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law confers upon the board
the power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 256 The court held that
section 141 authorized the board to adopt the Rights Plan because, contrary to Moran's
arguments, the Rights Plan did not prevent stockholders from receiving tender offers,
and did not unduly alter the corporate structure. 257 Furthermore, the court reasoned,
the Rights Plan did not preclude future judicial review, since the board would still be
subject to its fiduciary duties and could not arbitrarily refuse to honor an offeror's
request to redeem the rights. 258 Finally, the court noted, the Rights Plan was not unduly
harmful to either the corporation's financial structure and assets or its governance
structure.258 Finding that the Rights Plan neither broadened the board's discretion in
blocking takeover attempts, nor made Household takeover-proof, nor altered the cor-
porate structure more than other defensive measures, 26" the court held that the Rights
Plan did not constitute an unauthorized transfer of power from shareholders to direc-
tors :261
The court then turned to Moran's contention that the Rights Plan restricted stock-
holder rights to conduct proxy contests. 262 The court identified the primary question as
whether the restriction upon individuals or groups from first acquiring 20% or more of
253 Id. The court distinguished Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), which struck down
a state takeover statute as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, because, unlike
MITE, there was no state action in the case at bar. Moran, 500 A,2d at 1353.
2" Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
255 Id.
256 Id. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983). Section 141 provides:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is
made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed
upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such
extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incor-
poration.
Id.
257 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. The court cited the takeover of Crown Zellerbach, which had
adopted a similar rights plan, by Sir James Goldsmith, as well as several possible means of acquisition





262 Id. at 1355. The "20% trigger" term of the rights causes the rights to be exercisable when
any party or group becomes beneficial owner of 20% or more of Household stock. Id. at 1348.
Moran contended that the rights would be triggered by a successful proxy solicitation. Id. at 1355.
The court determined, based upon treatise law, that the transfer of a proxy vote creates a revocable
agency relationship and not beneficial ownership. Id. at 1355 (citing H. HENN 84 J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 87, § 196, at 518). Thus, a proxy solicitation would not trigger the rights.
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shares before waging a proxy contest fundamentally restricted the stockholders' right to
conduct a proxy contest."' The court concluded, based upon the trial court's findings, 264
that the effect upon proxy contests would be minimal considering the evidence estab-
lished at trial that many proxy contests are won with an insurgent ownership of less than
20%, and that very large holdings are no guarantee of success. 265
Having found that the board's action was within its scope of authority, the Moran
court then examined whether the directors had satisfied their burden of going forward
with evidence in accordance with the Unocal test. 266
 Pursuant to 'this test, the court
required the directors to show reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed, and to show that the defense adopted was reasonable
in relation to the threat posed.2"7
 The court also stressed that it gave a high degree of
credibility to the board's evidence of a perceived threat and the reasonableness of a
defense where the majority of directors voting to adopt a defensive plan are indepen-
dent. 265
Applying the first tier of the Unocal test, the court reviewed the threat that the board
perceived was facing the corporation, the threat in the marketplace of coercive two-tier
tender offers. 269
 The court held that the evidence Household presented adequately
demonstrated that the board adopted the Rights Plan in reaction to what it perceived as
a threat to the corporation. The court deemed this threat reasonable for the adoption
of a defensive measure. 2"
The court also found that the Household directors satisfied the second tier of the
Unocal analysis, the reasonableness of the defense in relation to the threat posed. 271 The
court noted evidence of the board's concern with two-tier and "bust-up" takeovers, in
which an acquirer sells off the independently operating subsidiaries which comprise the
corporation acquired, and held that the board adopted a reasonable defense mechanism
to protect itself. 272 Based on its determination that the Rights Plan had only limited
effects on the corporate structure, the board's scope of authority, and the shareholders'
rights, the court found the Rights Plan to be reasonable. 273 Therefore, the court afforded
the Household board the benefit of the business judgment rule presumptions. 274 The
court held that Moran had not rebutted the business judgment rule presumptions, and
upheld the board's adoption of the Rights Plan. 275
Moran further alleged that the Household board breached their fiduciary duty to
shareholders by failing to act on an informed basis. 276
 The court noted that the House-
hold board received a description and summary of the Rights Plan prior to adopting it,
2" Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
264 Id. The Vice Chancellor concluded that it would be "highly conjectural" to assume that this
limitation would frustrate a shareholder seeking to assert his views. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1080.
265 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
266 Id. at 1357.
267 Id, at 1356 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
765 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
266 Id.
270 Id. at 1357.
271 Id.
272 Id.	
275 Id. at 1354,
274 Id .




and engaged in extended discussion with its legal and financial counse1. 277 Applying the
Smith v. Van Gorkom standard, the court found that the board was not grossly negligent
in its failure to review available information and therefore held that the decision was
made after reasonable investigation. 278
In concluding its opinion, the court emphasized that deferring to the board's judg-
ment under the business judgment rule in this case did not terminate the courts power
to review the directors' actions relating to takeovers. 219
 The court found that the directors'
fundamental duties to the corporation and its shareholders were still enforceable. 280 The
directors' ultimate response to an actual takeover attempt and their compliance with
their fiduciary duty to shareholders, the court reasoned, would be subject to review if
the directors were to refuse to redeem the rights upon request of an offeror. 2''
III. MORAN: TAKING THE BITE OUT OF UNOCAL
The Moran decision represents an unduly lenient interpretation of precedent estab-
lished by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 2' 2 The Unocal
court developed a two-part threshold test to determine whether a board of directors
should be granted business judgment rule presumptions. Moran minimized this test and
protected the Household board's action after a limited threshold review. The Moran
court granted business judgment rule presumptions to the Household board's decision
to adopt a poison pill rights plan despite the absence of a specific threat to the corpo-
ration, as was present in Unocal, and without consideration of the reasonableness of the
defensive measure in relation to the vague threat. The Moran court found the Rights
Plan to be a reasonable defense, but never justified the need for the action.
The Moran decision expands the scope of directors' discretion, thereby permitting
directors to undermine fundamental principles of corporate law. The remainder of this
casenote will analyze the source of the Moran court's error, and - the resulting evils the
directors wrought upon the corporation — the entrenchment of the directors, the breach
of their fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders, the denial of shareholder democracy,
and the inversion of the corporate structure. This casenote will conclude with a discussion
of Delaware corporate statutory law and federal law foundations which reinforce the
argument for strict scrutiny of parties infringing on the shareholders' rights to receive
and consider tender offers.
A. The Source of Error
Recognizing the inherent conflict directors face in deterring hostile takeovers, the
Moran court held that directors adopting poison pill rights plans must satisfy the Unocal
277 Id.
228
 Id. (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873). The court reviewed the record and found that the
board had been supplied with information providing the essentials of the Plan as well as a summary
of the Plan and articles on the takeover environment. The literature along with the presentations
by advisors and ensuing discussions, the court held, constituted reasonable investigation. Moran,
500 A.2d at 1356.
278 Id. at 1357.
2x0
281 Id.
282 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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threshold test. 283 Unocal held that directors may receive the business judgment rule's
presumptions of propriety only after the directors have demonstrated reasonable
grounds for believing the corporation was threatened, and have shown that their adopted
defense was reasonable in relation to the threat."' By extending the application of the
Unocal test to cases involving prospective measures, the Moran court helped ensure the
protection of shareholders. The Moran court erred, however, by loosely applying the
Unocal test in determining the validity of the Household Rights Plan. The Unocal thresh-
old examinations were designed to prevent directors from defeating hostile tender offers
which do not pose a harmful threat to the corporation.285 The Moran precedent defeats
the Unocal test by permitting boards to adopt defense measures deterring takeover
attempts which would not be harmful to the corporation.
The Household board adopted the Rights Plan "in reaction to what it perceived to
be the threat in the marketplace of coercive two-tier tender offers." 286 The Moran court
held that this stated threat satisfied the Unocal requirement for believing a threat to the
corporation existed. 287 This general threat of takeover, however, is marketwide; every
corporation is subjected to it. Thus, if a court accepts this general marketplace charac-
teristic as satisfying the board's burden of identifying a threat to which it reacted, the
court will render the first tier of the Unocal test nugatory. A&ording to Moran, therefore,
every corporation is justified in adopting prospective poison pill provisions.
Moreover, in applying the second tier of the Unocal test, the Moran court did not
scrutinize the relationship between this general fear of takeovers and the adoption of
the Rights Plan by the Household board. While courts should permit directors to adopt
prospective defensive measures,"" courts must also ensure that shareholders' rights to
tender their shares are not unnecessarily inhibited. 2" Thus, to ensure that a defensive
plan is designed to deter only harmful takeovers, courts must examine the terms and
effects of the measure in light of the board's stated fear. 29"
An analysis of whether the board properly tailored its defensive mechanism to the
demonstrated threat pervades the Unocal decision. 291
 This analysis is absent in Moran.
The Moran court extensively examined the board's authority to adopt the Rights Plan, 292
2" Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
2" Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958-59. The Unocal test first required the board to demonstrate a threat
of potential harm to the corporation. Id. Next, the board was required to show that the defensive
measure was reasonably tailored to meet that harm. Id. The reasonableness of the measure must,
therefore, be judged not only by its ability to prevent the harm, but also by its potential effect on
harmless takeovers and other shareholder interests. Id.
2"n
	 at 955. The Unocal threshold test required the board to demonstrate reasonable grounds
for believing the corporation was threatened. Id. if there was no present danger, the board would
not satisfy the threshold requirement and any defense mechanism adopted would be invalid.
286 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
287 Id.
2" The Moran court noted that a board which suddenly finds itself faced with a threatening
takeover may act unreasonably or irrationally. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350. Therefore, the court
approved of prospective defensive measures which could be carefully planned in anticipation of a
takeover threat. Id.
2" See Treadway Companies v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,381 (2d Cir. 1980).
290 Note, supra note 22, at 1971.
211
 The Unocal court extensively reviewed the effects of the defensive action and went further
to determine the fairness to all of the parties involved. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57.
292 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
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but it never alluded to the necessity of the poisonous two-for-one flip-over provision. By
failing to seek board justification for the specific provisions of the Rights Plan, the court
allowed the board to retain an overly broad defensive measure. As a result, the Rights
Plan would deter takeover attempts that would be favorable to shareholders, as well as
those that would be harmful. This is a result which should not be permitted under a
proper application of the Unocal test.
B. The Impact of Moran
I. The Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duty
In adopting the Rights Plan, the Household board sought to protect shareholders
from coercive two-tier takeovers, but also sought to install themselves as negotiating
agents for considering tender offers on behalf of the shareholders. 295 This role violates
the fiduciary duty directors owe the corporation's shareholders. By affording presump-
tions of propriety to the Household board's adoption of the Rights Plan, the court has
condoned a corporate board's use of its discretion unilaterally to expand its own scope
of authority. This power could vitiate any duty or accountability directors owe share-
holders. Although shareholders retain the right to remove directors,294 shareholders
generally lack the organization, means, and motivation required to effect a removal and
replacement of directors. 295 This weakness emphasizes the importance of courts' strictly
enforcing the fiduciary duty directors owe shareholders.
The directors' fiduciary duty is derived from their capacity as trustees of the cor-
poration for the benefit of the shareholders. 296 If the directors' sole or primary purpose
for defending the corporation is entrenchment, however, then they breach their fiduciary
duty. 297 When a court affords a board the benefit of the business judgment rule pre-
sumptions, there is no opportunity to review the board action in the absence of fraud,
bad faith, or gross overreaching 2 98 and a breach of fiduciary duty may escape review.
To prevent this unaccountability, the Unocal court established a threshold test of the
directors' purpose and method before business judgment rule presumptions could be
applied.299 Where the Unocal test is not strictly applied, directors' breaches of their
fiduciary duties may continue to escape judicial review, and shareholders' rights may be
infringed.
The Moran court's loose application of the Unocal test will thus expand the concept
of directors' fiduciary duties at the expense of shareholders' rights. The Household
board, in adopting the Rights Plan, claimed to be protecting shareholders against coercive
takeovers and inequitable treatment. A defense designed to guarantee a fair exchange
or to prevent inadequate tender offers would fulfill a fiduciary duty.s" Instead, the
293 Moran, 490 A.2d at 1066.
294 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1983).
295 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 209 (5th ed. 1982)
("shareholders who are extremely dissatisfied often prefer to sell rather than vote . . . incumbent
management will normally be protected in its control by the heavy costs and poor prospects that
proxy lights involve").
299 Lofland v. Cahill, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 389, 118 A. I, 3 (1922).
297
 Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
2" See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
299
	 493 A.2d at 954.
3c"} Id. at 957.
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Household board adopted a plan to deter all hostile tender offers and to require bidders
to negotiate with the board. To the extent that a defense hinders nonharmful tender
offers, the board is entrenching itself. Actions for the purpose of entrenchment conflict
with the directors' fiduciary duty requiring that directors' actions be taken in good faith
for valid business purposes. 3°'
The Moran court cited several cases illustrating that defending the corporation
constituted a valid corporate purpose deserving of judicial deference. 302
 In the cited
cases, courts generally required directors to demonstrate substantial business reasons for
any action which was designed primarily to prevent a threatened takeover. 303
 The House-
hold board did not cite a substantial business reason when it enacted the Rights Plan.
The Rights Plan adopted by Household was an obstacle to all takeovers, good or bad.
The rights plan adopted by Household installs the board as negotiating agent for
considering all tender offers on behalf of shareholders. Thus, by their control of the
decision whether to redeem the rights, the board has the increased power to determine
the fate of any tender offer. Potentially, the board could refuse to redeem the rights
without a valid business purpose. While such rejections would be indicative of ulterior
motives and a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty,311 the courts would have difficulty
in establishing a breach of duty. Although the directors may have defeated a tender
offer, the only action which the court would have to review would be the directors'
inaction. Once a rights plan is in place, a tender offer cannot succeed unless the directors
redeem the rights. Therefore, for the directors to do nothing is fatal to the offer.
Judicial review of inaction is necessarily limited because there is no evidence from
which a court can construe the directors' purpose. When a board adopts a rights plan,
a court can review the terms to ensure that it is carefully tailored to a clear threat which
901 Id. at 954.
302 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
3°3 The Moran opinion cited several cases supporting the application of the business judgment
rule to antitakeover activities. Id. at 1350. In all of these cases, the courts carefully justified the
directors' roles in the transactions. For example, in Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Ina, where the plaintiff
challenged the issuance of the board's sale of discounted subordinated debentures containing
springing warrants, the court denied an injunction because the warrant represented a fairly priced
financing tool and the springing provision provided for a stock conversion at a reasonable exercise
price. 741 F.2d 707, 722-24 (5th Cir. 1984).
In Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings and Loan, the Lincoln board adopted supermajority
voting requirements for the removal of directors and for shareholders to amend the bylaws. 749
F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1984). The court upheld the action upon the directors. demonstration of
the insurgent's intent to remove alt directors and liquidate the company. Id. at 376. The court found
that the board reasonably believed that a liquidation would substantially decrease the value of stock
held by the shareholders. Id. at 378.
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981) and Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. III. 1982), the challenged transactions,
the purchase and the sale of assets, respectively, were in the regular course of business and the
courts reviewed only the independence of the parties involved in finding that self-dealing was not
involved. Panter, 646 F.2d at 297; Whittaker, 535 F. Supp at 951.
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp 623 (D. Md. 1982), plaintiff sought to
enjoin a counter tender offer by a target corporation. The court stated, "the public interest requires
that a tender offer, probably legal, be permitted to proceed without intervention by the courts ....
The stockholders are entitled to exercise their own judgment as to these matters .... The decision
whether to buy, exchange, or do neither should rest with each individual stockholder." Id. at 635
(quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
304 See Note, supra note 22, at 1971-72 ("tilt would be manifestly improper for the redemption
or conversion price to be a multiple of the tender price.").
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the board seeks to avert. The rights plan itself is a manifestation of the board's action
which can be scrutinized to uncover ulterior motives. When a board refuses to act, the
court has no product to look at and is bound to accept any rational reason for refusal
which the directors allege, there being no evidence available to disprove their statement.
Thus, by loosely applying the Unocal test, the Moran court increased the likelihood that
directors' breaches of their fiduciary duties will escape judicial scrutiny, and as a result
shareholders will be injured.
2. Shareholder Democracy
Beyond their role of governing the business and affairs of the corporation, 903 the
directors also have fiduciary duties to protect the interests of the shareholders." 6 This
duty includes determining whether a tender offer is in the best interests of the corTio-
ration and its shareholders."' Even with this broad mandate, directors are not authorized
to control every aspect of the corporate existence. 306 For example, unless a board can
show that a tender offer is not in the corporation's best interests, it is not the role of the
board to determine whether shareholders will be allowed to accept it."" If the offer is
not harmful, the board's role is to analyze critically all available information and present
it to the shareholders so that they may decide for themselves whether it is in their interest
to accept. 91 ° Corporate laws also reserve for shareholders the rights to elect and remove
directors; 3 " to amend the corporate bylaws; 512 to vote on substantial dispositions of
assets, 413 on mergers and consolidations, 3 i 4 on the dissolution of the corporation ; 510 and
3"s
	
CODE ANN. tit. 8, 1 141(a) (1983).
3" Unocal, 493 A.2(1 at 954.
"7 Id.
3" See supra notes 215-20 arid accompanying text for a discussion of shareholders' rote in
deciding questions of corporate existence.
300 See generally S. REP. No. 550; H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N Ews 2811.
310 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
3 " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 141(a) (1983).
312 Id. § 216(a). Section 216(a) provides in part:
After a corporation has received any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt,
amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote ... provided,
however, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors .... The fact that such power has
been so conferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case may be, shall not
divest the stockholders or members of the power, nor limit their power to adopt,
amend, or repeal bylaws.
Id.
313 1d. § 271(a). Section 271(a) provides, in part: "[e]very corporation may at any meeting of its
board of directors or governing body sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all of its property
and assets ... when and as authorized by a resolution adopted by a majority of the outstanding
stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon .... "
Id.
314
	 § 251 (requiring the board to 'adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or
consolidation" stating the proposed terms and to submit it "to the stockholders of each constituent
corporation at an annual or special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement").
315 Id. § 275(a). Section 275(a) provides:
If it should be deemed advisable in the judgment of the board of directors of any
corporation that it should be dissolved, the board, after the adoption of a resolution
to that effect by a majority of the whole board at any meeting called for that purpose,
shall cause notice to be mailed to each stockholder entitled to vote thereon of the
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to sue the corporation derivatively when the action of corporate personnel constitutes a
wrong to the corporation. 16
 Directors must seek shareholder authorization to amend
the certificate of incorporation, or to make unusual transactions. 417
 These voting rights
are part of the "corporate democracy" which allows shareholders to check the directors'
unfettered discretion in corporate affairs.
Issuance of preferred stock rights or similar securities by the board alone for
purposes other than financing may, if its impact on shareholder rights is drastic and
unjustified, be analogous to transactions which require shareholder approval.5 t 5 By fail-
ing to scrutinize properly such extraordinary actions of directors, courts fail to protect
the corporate democracy. Courts must, therefore, reject the argument that it is within
the directors' managerial capacity to grant themselves greater discretionary power — as
the Household board was permitted to do. If future courts abide by the Moran standard,
corporate boards will he able to circumvent limitations imposed upon the scope of their
power by their fiduciary obligations, and matters traditionally requiring shareholder
consent may be resolved through unilateral board action.319
The Moran court found that the directors did not circumvent their fiduciary duty
because the Rights Plan was not the board's last reviewable action. 32" The court reasoned
that the board would still be subject to their fiduciary duty when a tender offer was
presented and directors were requested to redeem the rights. 321 This "second chance
review" of the directors' refusal to redeem the rights, as noted, 322
 is not as effective as
scrutinizing the directors' purposes in the first instance, when they adopted the defensive
measure. This second chance review also fails to account for the potential bidders who
are discouraged from making any offer. Preparation of a tender offer requires extensive
adoption of the resolution and of a meeting of stockholders to take action upon the
resolution.
Id.
3 ' 6 See id. § 327; FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
5 ' 7 See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605-06 (Del. 1974).
312 Where a Rights Plan entrenches management or impairs the proxy process, shareholders'
right to elect and remove directors is infringed. Where a Rights Plan creates a fundamental change
in the corporate structure, the adoption of the plan is analogous to an amendment to the corporate
charter, an act that requires a shareholder vote. Adoption of a Rights Plan that cannot be justified
as protection for shareholders' interests is an ultra vires act if unilaterally enacted by the board of
directors.
312
 The Chancery Court's opinion in Moran, 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1984), discussed the
doctrine of "independent legal significance," whereby "if an action can be accomplished under one
section of General Delaware Corporation Law it need not satisfy the requirements of another
section which permits the same result." Id. at 1077 (citations omitted). The Household board sought
to inhibit partial tender offers and, after being convinced that a fair price amendment would not
easily obtain shareholder majority approval, adopted a plan which would achieve the same result
without requiring shareholder support (via a board resolution). Where a board of directors is
permitted to circumvent the need for shareholder majority vote on an unusual transaction, the
independent legal significance doctrine clashes with the rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285
A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971), which provides that an inequitable action is not permissible merely
because it is not in violation of the law.
"° Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
32t Id.
322 See supra note 304 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties a court faces
in reviewing the directors' refusal to redeem poison pill rights.
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research and expenses. The added risk, that the directors as well as the shareholders
may reject the offer, may curtail the bidders from even considering the target. The gain
to the directors in their power to negotiate may well be borne by shareholders in their
loss of premiums. The result is that directors realize an increase in their autonomy and
decisionmaking power, while the shareholder is deprived of his traditional decisionmak-
ing role in questions of ownership and stock transfers.
3. The Corporate Structure
The Moran court analyzed the effect of the Rights Plan on the corporate structure
and determined that it caused less harm to the value structure of the corporation than
other defenses and caused little change in the governance structure.323 The noneconomic
impact is an advantage rights plans generally have over other defenses. 324 Adopting and
implementing a rights plan may have no tangible effects. 325
The court concluded that the Rights Plan had little effect on the governance struc-
ture because the board would still be subject to review upon refusal to redeem the rights,
and also because numerous methods ; .o launch successfully a hostile tender offer still
existed. 32 The court's rationale that the Rights Plan was reasonable since certain types
of takeover plans may be successful, does not, however, justify an attempt by a board to
curtail any takeovers other than those demonstrated to be harmful to shareholders.
Permitting a board to enlarge its scope of authority or broaden their discretion to any
degree greater than that required to protect corporate interests is not in the shareholders'
interests, The Unocal threshold test was designed to prevent directors from unduly
infringing on shareholder rights by requiring a careful tailoring of the defensive measure
adopted to the harm which the directors demonstrated threatened shareholders. 327 By
failing to apply Unocal properly, the Moran court permitted the board to alter the
corporate structure unnecessarily.
323 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
3" See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the qualities of poison pill
rights plans. In contrast to the noneconomic effects of rights plans are the devastating effects of
scorched earth tactics in which a most profitable subsidiary may be sold off. See, e.g., Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. III. 1982) (target corporation sold its most attractive
subsidiary to avert a takeover).
325 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. The Moran court stated, "the implementation of the plan neither
results in any outflow of money from the corporation nor impairs its financial flexibility. It does
not dilute earnings per share and does not have any adverse tax consequences for the corporation
or its shareholders." Id.
326 Id. The Moran court found that
[t]he evidence at trial also evidenced many methods around the Plan ranging from
tendering with a condition that the board redeem the Rights, tendering with a high
minimum condition of shares and Rights, tendering and soliciting consents to remove
the Board and redeem the Rights, to acquiring 50% of the shares and causing House-
hold to self-tender for the Rights.
Id. Contrary to the court's findings, both Moran and the Securities Exchange Commission amicus
brief stated that the Rights Plan would deter virtually all hostile takeover attempts. Id.
3" Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The Unocal court developed a test of reasonable tailoring. The
court found that Unocal passed this test because the defensive measure was fair to stockholders.
Id. at 956. This implies that a defense which treats shareholders unfairly would not pass muster
under Unocal.
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4. Foundations in State Corporation Law
Courts need not rely solely on the common law for finding bases for imposing
restrictions on directors' discretion. State corporation statutes also recognize limits to a
board of directors' authority to infringe on shareholder rights. For example, in Delaware,
as owners of the corporation, shareholders receive certain protected property rights.
Section 212 of the Delaware General Corporation Law guarantees stockholders the right
to vote to protect their interests and investments in the corporation.m Section 159 deems
stock to be personal property and transferable. 329
 Section 202 grants the right to transfer
securities free from any restrictions which are unreasonable or nonexistent when the
stock was purchased or those to which the holder did not specifically agree. 9 ' 0 These
property rights are fundamental and strictly protected by the courts."'
When directors place themselves between a bidder extending an offer and the
shareholders intended to receive it, they effectively restrict the shareholders' ability to
transfer their shares. This is a violation of section 202(b) if the shareholder has not
consented specifically." Delaware law generally disfavors restraints on alienation, refus-
ing to enforce them where they are ambiguous, uncertain, or not adopted in relation to
a valid business purpose?" When a court reviews a rights plan which ultimately will
restrict the shareholders' ability to sell their stock, the state corporation statutes must be
s28 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1983). Section 212(a) provides in part, "[u]nless otherwise
provided in the certificate of incorporation and subject to § 213 of this title, each stockholder shall
be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital stock held by such stockholder." Id.
529 Id. § 159. Section 159 provides in part, "[t]he shares of stock in every corporation shall be
deemed personal property and transferable as provided in Article 8 of subtitle 1 of Title 6." Id.
3" Id. § 202(b). Section 202(b) provides:
A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of securities of a corpo-
ration may be imposed either by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws or
by an agreement among any number of security holders or among such holders and
the corporation. No restriction so imposed shall be binding with respect to securities
issued prior to the adoption of the restriction unless the holders of the securities are
parties to an agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.
Id. The statute further regulates the types of restrictions that may be adopted to ensure their
reasonableness. See Id, § 202(c)—(e).
"' See, e.g., Norlin, 744 F.2d at 267 ("we have never given the slightest indication that we would
sanction a board decision to lock up voting power by any means"); Hill v. Warner, Berman & Spitz,
P.A., 197 N.J. Super. 152, 166, 484 A.2d 344, 351 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) ("restraint on
the transfer of the corporate stock is against public policy and therefore unlawful and invalid").
"2 See supra note 330 for the text of section 202(b). The statute refers generally to direct
restrictions such as that enjoined in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, v. Conoco, Inc., in which the
corporation would not recognize any transfers of shares to "aliens," making the transfer ineffective.
519 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D. Del. 1981). Indirect restraints, however, may constitute a violation of the
shareholder's right to transfer stock. See, e.g., B & H Warehouse v. Atlas Van Lines, 490 F.2d 818,
821 (5th Cir. 1974) (requirement that shareholder offer his shares to the corporation at a prede-
termined book value on a first refusal basis, prior to selling shares otherwise was enjoined due to
lack of shareholder consent); Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 398-99, 2 A.2d
249, 251 (1938) (invalidating a provision in corporation's certificate of incorporation permitting the
board to repurchase at book value any shares acquired through an unapproved sale). Through
these measures, the boards of Atlas and Rollins reserved the power to determine whether a buyer
could purchase shares at a reasonable price and protect his ownership. The Atlas and Rollins courts
enjoined these restrictions since they represented transfers of power to the directors which could
only be accomplished with shareholder consent.
"3 Atlas, 490 F.2d at 826-27.
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considered." A corporation must present valid business reasons for any restrictions
placed on the shareholders' ability to sell their stock. Under a stricter review of corporate
purpose, the Moran Rights Plan might not have satisfied these corporate statutes.
5. Foundations in Federal Law
The Unocal court established a higher standard of shareholder protection than was
previously granted by Delaware courts. While this degree of protection may be novel to
state corporate law," 5
 it has long been present in federal law. 356 Although corporate law
is generally considered a field of state law jurisdiction, Congress has resolved to increase
shareholder protection. Federal law protection of shareholders is primarily found in the
Williams Act, which provides procedural requirements for all parties engaged in tender
offers to insure that shareholders are fully informed and have a reasonable amount of
time to decide whether to tender their shares."' The language of the Williams Act,
amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, demands that no party to a tender
offer engage in acts that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. 338 Despite this broad
language, the Williams Act is interpreted as a disclosure requirement and not an en-
hanced fiduciary duty burdening directors. 5" The legislative history of the Act indicates
that Congress believed that the shareholders are the proper party for making tender
offer acceptance decisions, and thus sought to insure that shareholders receive a fair
opportunity to consider tender offers."° In debates over the Williams Act, Congress has
"4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1983).
335 See, e.g., Norlin, 744 F.2d at 258 (holding that shareholders must make the decisions affecting
a corporation's ultimate destiny).
"° See The Williams Act § 14(d)—(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982) (amending The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964)).
"7
 The Williams Act amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)—(f), set
requirements for director and bidder disclosure in tender offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)—(f) (1982).
Section 78n(e) of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders
in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
Id. The Act also requires proper notice of intent to commence a tender offer for large blocks of
shares and a mandatory period for which offers must be extended. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
"8 See supra note 337.
359 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977).
m° S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2811, 2812; Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae, at 14-15, Moran v.
Household Intl, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
In Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), the
court found that the legislative intent of the 1968 amendment to section 78n was to insure that
public shareholders to whom tender offers are made should have the benefit of a full statement
from the offeror with a chance for incumbent management to explain its position publicly. Id. at
945. Target management also is subject to disclosure requirements, so as to give investors the same
opportunity to make informed decisions with respect to takeover attempts whether the vehicle
employed in any such attempt is the obtaining of proxies or the acquisition of voting control
through tender offers. Id. at 945-46.
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indicated that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they provide a check on
entrenched but inefficient management,"' and sought to preserve for shareholders the
economic opportunities which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock
of a target company.342 Congress has repeatedly asserted its policy of evenhandedness
in takeover struggles, maintaining a balance between management and the bidder such
that neither party could influence unduly the tendering process. 343
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,544 the United States Supreme Court found that Congress
sought to protect the investor not only by informing him, but also by withholding from
management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an
informed choice. 345 The Edgar Court struck down a state statute whose provisions re-
quired an acquirer to give precommencement notification of a pending tender offer
because the statutory provisions were unfair to the acquirer. 396 The Court found that
the provisions "furnish incumbent management with a powerful tool to combat tender
offers, perhaps to the detriment of the stockholders." 347 The Court followed Congress'
lead in protecting takeover attempts and in placing shareholders in the forefront of the
decisionmaking arena. 545 The United States Supreme Court thereby set an example of
how state courts might follow the lead of Congress.
Although corporation law traditionally has been controlled by the states, Congress
could intercede, enforcing its desired standard of shareholder protection, and achieving
certain benefits through uniformity by preempting under the commerce clause. 549 Al-
though Congress has never adopted a proposal to this effect, it has expressed its desire
to maintain evenhandedness between directors and bidders while protecting the investing
shareholder.55° State law tends to inhibit tender offers for the benefit of management,
and seeks to regulate the internal corporate structure."' The gap representing the
differences between state and federal law, the disparity between levels of shareholder
protection, is one which courts could narrow by scrutinizing directors' purposes in
adopting defensive measures. The test provided by Unocal, if properly employed, would
provide an adequate level of scrutiny.
Unocal is an example of a court applying state law to review a board's actions in a
takeover situation where the court afforded an increased level of protection to share-
holders. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., a 1984 Second Circuit case, is another example
where a court focused on protecting the stockholder when the board adopted unreason-
341 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS
2811, 2812.
392 See 113 CONG. REC. 524,666 (daily ed. Aug. 29, 1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
343 See 113 CONG. REC. S24,665 (daily ed. Aug. 29, 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("We
have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bids.").
344 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
343 Id. at 634.
346 Id.
347 Id. at 635.
348
 Id, at 633.
343 See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 697
(1974).
33° See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977).
351 See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278-80 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Idaho law's promanagement provisions preempted by Williams Act), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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able defense measures.332 The Norlin court declared that its most important duty was to
protect the fundamental structure of corporate governance. 353 The court noted that
directors manage the day-to-day affairs of a company, but shareholders, in accordance
with democratic procedures, must make the decisions affecting a corporation's ultimate
destiny. 354
 The court acknowledged the duty of the board to protect the corporation
against takeover attempts that are not in the corporate interest, but condemned the
board for its failure to demonstrate that the defense adopted was fair and reasonable.'"
Voicing its primary concern, which coincided with the concerns expressed by Congress,
the court insisted that it must not approve "a wholesale wresting of corporate power
from the hands of the shareholders, to whom it is entrusted by statute, and into the
hands of the officers and directors." 356
 Norlin, in harmony with congressional expressions
of concern for shareholder protection, reinforces the importance of protecting the
interests of shareholders in corporate transactions, and contradicts notions that share-
holders must succumb to directors' plenary power in all corporate matters. Whereas the
Moran court assumed that the board had authority to infringe on shareholder rights
where the board could provide minimal justification, Congress and other courts have
decided to promote shareholder interests with greater resolve.
IV. CONCLUSION
Poison pills are not an inherently evil creation. Properly constructed, rights plans
are a highly practical means of eliminating a very real threat to shareholders, such as
coercive two-tier takeovers of the sort proposed by TniCione Pickens, which formed the
basis for Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum C0. 357
 In the face of such a threat, a board is
justified in adopting a rights plan under which any tender offeror willing to offer all
shareholders a fair price can do so without board interference.n 3
 Any rights plan,
558 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984). In Norlin, the board of a corporation targeted for a
takeover took two defensive actions: transfer of a large block of common stock to a wholly owned
subsidiary (in consideration of the cancellation of a promissory note), and creation of an employee
stock option to which a large block of shares was transferred and three directors were appointed
as voting trustees. Id. at 259. The court found both of these defensive actions to be improper. Id.
at 264, 266.
" Id. at 258.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 266-67. The court analyzed the board's creation of the stock option plan, noting that
an ESOP:
may serve a number of legitimate corporate purposes .... [W]hen an employee stock
options plan is set up in the context of a contest for control, however, it devolves upon
the board to show that the plan was in fact created to benefit the employees, and not
simply to further the aim of managerial entrenchment.
Id. at 266. Commendably, the court refused to accept Norlip's contention that the plan served
"important corporate and shareholder interests," because its arguments did not "establish the
independent legitimacy of the actions taken by the board to counter a perceived threat." Id. at 267.
356 Id.
357 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
358 As demonstrated in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndretes & Forbes Holdings, Inc., rights plans may also
be used effectively as a means of maximizing the return to shareholders where there is competitive
bidding for control. Nos. 353, 354, slip op. at 7 (Mar. 13, 1986). The court noted its approval of
the rights plan adopted, however, after the board removed the plan, so it was no longer a barrier
to an acquirer's offer.
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however, that is more intrusive on shareholder rights than is necessary to achieve the
directors' legitimate objectives should require shareholder majority approval.
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,359 the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed
for the first time the legitimacy of a preferred share purchase rights plan adopted by a
hoard as a prospective takeover defense. The Moran court held that the business judg-
ment rule was the appropriate standard for reviewing the board's defensive action of
adopting a poison pill rights plan. 36° Recognizing the inherent conflict which directors
face when deterring hostile takeovers, however, the Moran court held that directors
should bear an initial burden. 361 Applying the Unocal threshold test, the court required
directors to show reasonable grounds for believing a threat to the corporation existed,
and to demonstrate that the action taken was reasonable in relation to that threat. 362 By
extending the application of the Unocal test to prospective defensive measures as well as
defenses against immediate threats, Moran improves the state of the business judgment
rule and shareholder protection.
The problem with the Moran decision, however, is its lenient application of the
Unocal test. When applying the first part of the test, the Moran court was satisfied with
the board's "perceived threat in the marketplace of coercive two-tier tender offers." 3"
If courts accept general market-wide threats as valid purposes, then directors need not
produce any greater justification to satisfy their "burden." When the court purported to
apply the second part of the test, requiring the bOard to prove that the defense was
reasonable in relation to the danger facing the corporation, it did not require the board
to justify the need for the controversial flip-over provision to meet the stated purpose.
By not scrutinizing the relationship between the Rights Plan and the stated danger, the
Moran court permitted the Household board to adopt a defense which would deter all
takeovers, even those which might be in the corporation's best interests. By upholding
the Rights Plan, the court permitted the directors to increase their discretionary power
at the expense of shareholders' fundamental rights.
DAVID S. NEWMAN
555 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
366 Id. at 1357.
561 /d. at 1356.
565 Id. These were the tests developed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal, 493 A.2d at
955.
161 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
